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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Consider two cases. In the first, a farmer finds a disabled 
man with the intellectual capacity of a twelve-year-old by the 
side of the road and takes him home. He makes the man work 
seven days a week for seventeen hours a day. The farmer pays 
him fifteen dollars a week for a while, but eventually requires 
that he work for free, providing him with only minimal food, 
shelter, clothing, and medical care. The farmer isolates the 
man from any contact with the outside world and subjects him 
to physical abuse. When the man escapes, the farmer captures 
him and returns him to work. This continues for twenty years.1 
In the second case, a successful college football coach con-
tracts with a university to work for five years in return for a 
six-figure annual salary. After coaching four seasons, the coach 
takes a more lucrative offer from a rival school. The first uni-
versity sues, seeking an order of specific performance requiring 
the coach to finish out his remaining season.2 
In a bit of perverse irony, the conventional wisdom on con-
tract remedies assumes that these two situations are essential-
ly analogous. Both are said to be examples of “involuntary ser-
vitude,” conditions so closely resembling slavery that they are 
constitutionally prohibited.3 The thesis of this Article is that 
the constitutional equation of these two cases is insupportable. 
 
 1. These facts are based on United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 
(1988). 
 2. These facts are based on Vanderbilt University v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 
751 (6th Cir. 1999). Under current law, of course, specific performance of a 
personal-service contract is not available, and in fact Vanderbilt sought the 
enforcement of a liquidated damages clause against DiNardo. Id. at 753.  
 3. The Thirteenth Amendment states in full: 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a pu-
nishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their ju-
risdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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Properly understood, the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws the 
farmer’s action but provides no protection to the coach, who can 
be held to his contract without violating the Constitution. 
All first-year law students learn the rule that “[a] promise 
to render personal service will not be specifically enforced,”4 
and many of them learn that the Thirteenth Amendment’s pro-
hibition on “involuntary servitude” requires this per se rule.5 
American courts,6 treatise writers,7 and commentators8 fre-
 
 4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981). 
 5. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 224–
30 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing specific performance and the Thirteenth Amend-
ment); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 617 
(4th ed. 1998) (same); HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 
¶ 6.05, at 6-27 to -30 (1986) (same); AMY HILSMAN KASTELY ET AL., CONTRACT-
ING LAW 1062 (1996) (same). 
 6. See, e.g., Woolley v. Embassy Suites, Inc., 278 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1991) (“There are a variety of reasons why courts are loathe to order 
specific performance of personal services contracts . . . . It would also run con-
trary to the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servi-
tude.” (citations omitted)); Beverly Glen Music, Inc. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 
224 Cal. Rptr. 260, 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (“An unwilling employee cannot be 
compelled to continue to provide services to his employer either by ordering 
specific performance of his contract, or by injunction. To do so runs afoul of the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary servitude.” (citing 
Poultry Producers of S. Cal., Inc. v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 288 (1922))). 
 7. See, e.g., ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1204, at 
401 (2006) (“A second reason [specific enforcement of personal-service con-
tracts is not given] is that we have a strong prejudice against any kind of invo-
luntary personal servitude. We insist upon liberty even at the expense of bro-
ken promises.”); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 
§ 127(E)(2), at 846 (4th ed. 2001) (“It is clear that personal service promises 
will not be specifically enforced. While the original resistance to specific en-
forcement of such promises was based on the difficulties of judicial supervi-
sion, the prohibition of involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States also may be violated by such an 
equitable decree.”); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND 
PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 640 (5th ed. 2003) (“Such an order might well violate 
the involuntary servitude clause of the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment.”); EDWARD 
YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS 
358 (1989) (“At least one commentator has suggested that specific performance 
might violate the prohibition of involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). 
 8. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 
VA. L. REV. 383, 444 (1993) (“[C]ourts have suggested that to give one person a 
claim against another’s human capital would create a form of involuntary ser-
vitude. The argument occasionally, but not always, suggests possible viola-
tions of the federal Constitution’s Thirteenth Amendment.”); Lea Vander-
Velde, The Thirteenth Amendment of Our Aspiration, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 855, 
856 (2007) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits specific perfor-
mance of personal-service contracts); Jeffrey Abbas et al., Model Human Re-
productive Technologies and Surrogacy Act, 72 IOWA L. REV. 943, 985–86 
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quently justify it on these grounds. The U.S. Supreme Court, 
however, has never directly ruled on the issue. Indeed, with few 
exceptions, the courts and commentators who make this claim 
do so with little detailed analysis of the text, history, or 
precedent construing the Thirteenth Amendment.9 This Article 
rejects the conventional wisdom, arguing that in most situa-
tions specific performance of a personal service contract does 
not violate the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Unlike most constitutional provisions, the Thirteenth 
Amendment contains no state action requirement. Rather, it 
forbids a particular set of conditions—slavery and “involuntary 
servitude”—declaring categorically that they shall not exist 
within the United States, regardless of how the conditions are 
brought about. Ultimately, the reach of the Thirteenth 
Amendment is determined not by what legal remedy is used, 
but rather by the condition of the promisor and whether he is 
in a condition of “involuntary servitude.” Accordingly, a con-
tract that was legally enforceable only by money damages 
would be unconstitutional if the background circumstances 
were such that the contract reduced the promisor to a condition 
of “involuntary servitude.” Likewise, the specific performance of 
a personal service contract would not violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment so long as the conditions resulting from its en-
forcement did not constitute “involuntary servitude.” On the 
other hand, in some circumstances the specific performance of a 
contract could be unconstitutional, not because of any per se 
constitutional prohibition on the remedy but because its use in 
a particular context would reduce the promisor to the condition 
of “involuntary servitude.” In short, the Thirteenth Amendment 
is concerned with the conditions of the contracting party, rather 
than any particular contractual remedy. 
The scope of the Thirteenth Amendment hinges on the 
meaning of “involuntary servitude.” The term has a rich histo-
ry. When the Reconstruction Congress adopted the Thirteenth 
Amendment in 1865, it lifted its text virtually verbatim from 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.10 Furthermore, prior to the 
Civil War, the term “involuntary servitude” had been used in 
 
(1987) (“[S]pecific enforcement of a personal service contract often puts the 
breaching party into a form of involuntary servitude.”).  
 9. There are important exceptions to this generalization, particularly the 
work of Lea VanderVelde. See generally Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1989). 
 10. See infra Part III.A.  
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the constitutions of more than a dozen states, and there was a 
body of case law construing its meaning.11 Hence, this Article 
argues that, when the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted, the 
term “involuntary servitude” already had an established legal 
meaning, making it analogous to other pre-existing legal terms 
incorporated into the Constitution. The pre-Thirteenth 
Amendment understanding of “involuntary servitude” indicates 
that the condition did not result from government compulsion 
of an unwilling actor, per se. Rather, courts and legislatures 
drawing the line between permissible enforcement of contracts 
and the creation of “involuntary servitude” under the guise of a 
voluntary agreement looked at four interrelated factors.12 First, 
did the promisor enter the contract while in a state of “perfect 
freedom,” or did the promisee have some overarching power 
over the promisor? Second, was the promisor compensated for 
her services with a “bona fide consideration,” or did the rela-
tionship constitute “unrequited toil?” Third, were there tem-
poral limits on the contract? Agreements extending over ex-
tremely long periods of time were suspect while more limited 
engagements were not. Finally, did the promisee—the master—
physically dominate and degrade the promisor—the servant—
with abuse and claim a right to personally capture her and re-
turn her to service if she tried to quit? 
Those who adopted the Thirteenth Amendment understood 
that they were choosing language whose meaning had been set-
tled by more than seventy years of legal practice.13 To be sure, 
many also had revolutionary aspirations regarding the changes 
they hoped to bring about through emancipation. The congres-
sional debates over the Thirteenth Amendment and its imple-
menting legislation, however, do not suggest any linguistic rev-
olution as to the meaning of “involuntary servitude.” The fact 
that even the most radical supporters of the Thirteenth 
Amendment used the language of the pre-war state laws and 
referenced the four factors constituting “involuntary servitude” 
to describe the post-war machinations of former slave owners 
suggests they were operating within a widely accepted linguis-
tic tradition. 
After a century and a half, the Supreme Court has yet to 
develop a clear doctrinal framework for analyzing claims of “in-
voluntary servitude.” Some of its more sweeping dicta suggest 
 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part III.B. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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that any attempt to coerce performance of a contract would 
constitute “involuntary servitude.”14 However, in every in-
stance in which the Court has actually found “involuntary ser-
vitude,” all four of the pre-war factors have been present.15 
Given this background of a well-developed legal meaning 
prior to the Civil War, the absence of any radical linguistic re-
definition of “involuntary servitude” in the period of the 
Amendment’s adoption, and an inchoate but in many ways con-
sistent body of Supreme Court holdings, I conclude that specific 
performance of a contract where none of the four factors is 
present would not violate the Constitution. To put the case in 
the starkest terms, the Thirteenth Amendment protects citi-
zens against degrading and slave-like domination regardless of 
how that condition is brought about. It does not protect, howev-
er, those who voluntarily enter into limited and well-
compensated contracts that involve no ongoing physical abuse 
or domination by the other party. Such parties can be held to 
their contracts without violating the Constitution. 
In Part II of this Article, I situate my argument within the 
broader context of debates over contract law, constitutional in-
terpretation, and the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Part III examines the meaning of “involuntary servitude” prior 
to the Thirteenth Amendment, laying special emphasis on the 
attempts of courts and lawmakers to distinguish between the 
legitimate enforcement of a contract and the creation of “invo-
luntary servitude.” Part IV turns to the Thirteenth Amendment 
ratification debates and the adoption of contemporary imple-
menting legislation, showing how the pre-Civil War meaning of 
“involuntary servitude” was carried forward into the new con-
stitutional amendment. Part V examines the interpretation of 
“involuntary servitude” in the courts. It concludes that these 
cases reveal the absence of a clear doctrinal framework for ap-
plying the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on “involuntary 
servitude” and contain some dicta suggesting that any coerced 
performance of a contract runs afoul of the Amendment. How-
ever, when the cases are understood in context, each instance 
in which the Court has found “involuntary servitude” is consis-
tent with the pre-Thirteenth Amendment understanding of the 
term. Part VI then applies this Article’s theory regarding “invo-
luntary servitude” to a typical case where a plaintiff might ask 
for specific enforcement of a personal service contract and con-
 
 14. See infra Part V.B. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
 2026 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:2020 
 
cludes that such a remedy would not run afoul of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. 
II.  SITUATING THE ARGUMENT   
As a preliminary matter, it is worthwhile to consider three 
issues regarding the context of the Thirteenth Amendment: 
First, why does the constitutional claim about the per se rule 
against specific performance matter? Second, how have pre-
vious scholars approached the Thirteenth Amendment? Third, 
what constitutional methodology informs the arguments put 
forward in this Article? 
A. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, THE COMMON LAW, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION AS A CONVERSATION-STOPPER 
Both doctrinal and scholarly developments in contract law 
suggest that there is a strong prima facie case to be made for 
the specific performance of personal service contracts. However, 
so long as the Thirteenth Amendment is generally accepted as 
foreclosing this development, there is little reason for courts 
and commentators to address this possibility. This Article ar-
gues that the Thirteenth Amendment does not bar the use of 
specific performance as a remedy and therefore seeks to open a 
space for conversation regarding its extension. 
In private law the basic remedial choice is between money 
damages and a court order.16 In contract law, “the modern 
trend is clearly in favor of the extension of specific relief at the 
expense of the traditional primacy of damages.”17 This trend 
can be seen, for example, in the availability of negative injunc-
tions for breach of personal service contracts. Initially, courts 
insisted that, because the law would not order a party to per-
form under an employment contract, it would also not issue an 
 
 16. There are other options, of course. For example, Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code gives secured creditors a self-help remedy, allowing 
them to take possession of debtors’ collateral and sell it without any judicial 
intervention. See U.C.C. § 9-609 (2004) (“Secured Party’s Right to Take Pos-
session After Default”). Cf. REPO MAN (Edge City 1984) (cult classic about the 
repossession industry). 
 17. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.4, at 854 (2d ed. 1990); see 
also J. Berryman, The Specific Performance Damages Continuum: An Histori-
cal Perspective, 17 OTTAWA L. REV. 295, 295 (1985) (“In the area of contract 
law a number of common law jurisdictions, both here [i.e., Canada] and 
abroad, are currently reappraising the availability of contractual remedies. A 
discernable trend appears to be forming around the liberalization of specific 
relief vis-à-vis damages.”) (citation omitted). 
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injunction forbidding an employee from working for a competi-
tor.18 This rule was relaxed in Lumley v. Wagner,19 where the 
court forbade Wagner, an opera singer, from performing for a 
rival theater in breach of her contract with Lumley.20 The rule 
has been further relaxed by allowing negative injunctions even 
when the original contract does not contain an explicit negative 
covenant.21 
The same trend can be seen with covenants not to compete. 
Initially, the law treated them with extreme suspicion. Indeed, 
in one early case the judge declared, “By God, if the plaintiff 
[suing on the negative covenant] were here he should go to 
prison until he paid a fine to the king.”22 Less colorfully, courts 
considered such covenants to be restraints of trade that had to 
be “cautiously considered, carefully scrutinized, looked upon 
with disfavor, strictly interpreted and reluctantly upheld.”23 
Over the years, however, the rule has been substantially re-
laxed, although courts continue to be concerned that such cove-
nants could contribute to monopolies.24 Nevertheless, at least 
 
 18. See, e.g., Kimberley v. Jennings, (1836) 58 Eng. Rep. 621, 621 (Ch.); 
Kemble v. Kean, (1829) 58 Eng. Rep. 619, 619 (Ch.). 
 19. (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch.). 
 20. Id.; cf. Whitwood Chem. Co. v. Hardman, (1891) 2 Ch. 416, 420 (C.A.) 
(following Lumley); Montague v. Flockton, (1873) 16 L.R.Eq. 189, 192 (Ch.) 
(U.K.) (same); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 380(2) (1932); id. § 380 illus. 6 
(based on Lumley). But see Note, Lumley v. Wagner Denied, 8 HARV. L. REV. 
172 (1894) (noting Justice Holmes’s rejection of the Lumley rule in Rice v. 
D’Arville, Mass. Suffolk Equity Session, Sept. 29, 1894). Interestingly, Justice 
Holmes did not seem to object in principle to specific performance of a contract 
to perform: 
I do aot [sic] quite see why, if an equitable remedy is to be given for 
the purpose of making an artist keep his contract, the usual remedy 
should not be given, and the whole of it; why, if I say, “If you do not 
sing for the plaintiff you shall not sing elsewhere.” I should not say, 
“If you do not sing for the plaintiff you shall go to prison.” 
Id. But see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 
457, 462 (1897) (“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a predic-
tion that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, — and nothing else.”).  
 21. See YORIO, supra note 7, at 369 (noting that in contrast to the British 
practice, “[u]nder American law, if the plaintiff otherwise meets its require-
ments, an injunction may issue even in the absence of a negative covenant in 
the contract”). 
 22. RICHARD A. LORD, 25 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 67:58, at 398 (4th 
ed. 2002) (quoting Dyer’s Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, pl. 26 (1414)). 
 23. Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 693 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. 1952). 
 24. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279–91 (6th 
Cir. 1898) (tracing the history of the common law hostility to covenants not to 
compete and the various exceptions created to the per se rule); Alan J. Meese, 
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one modern court has suggested that injunctions to enforce co-
venants not to compete should issue as a matter of course.25 
Even if this position is not widely followed, courts are willing to 
specifically enforce such covenants in many cases.26 
Likewise, contracts scholars have offered powerful argu-
ments in favor of specific performance. Approached normative-
ly, economics suggests that contract remedies should be ar-
ranged so as to provide incentives for contracting parties to 
behave efficiently. Parties should perform their contracts when 
it is efficient for them to do so, but the law should not incentiv-
ize performance in cases when breach would be more efficient.27 
In a world of perfect judicial information, we could force the 
breaching party to internalize the costs of breach through dam-
ages so that it would only be profitable to breach when the ben-
efits gained exceed the value of the lost performance to the 
breachee.28 But when courts cannot accurately determine the 
position that the breachee would have been in had the breacher 
performed, damages will not be set at a level where promisors 
will be given the proper incentives to perform. Furthermore, 
contract doctrine suggests that courts systematically under-
compensate promisees.29 For example, when courts cannot de-
termine the value of a promisee’s expectancy with certainty, 
they award nominal damages rather than trying to put the 
 
Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 21–23 (1999) 
(tracing the evolution of arguments against contracts providing for “general” 
restraints of trade); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(2) 
(1981) (setting forth the conditions under which a covenant in restraint of 
trade is merely ancillary to a valid transaction and therefore potentially enfor-
ceable). 
 25. See Moore v. Serafin, 301 A.2d 238, 243 (Conn. 1972) (holding that an 
injunction is issued automatically when a party threatens to violate a restric-
tive covenant); CUNA Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Butler, No. CV075002153, 2007 WL 
2038626, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 21, 2007) (“Irreparable injury and lack 
of an adequate remedy at law is considered to be automatically established 
where a party seeks to enforce a covenant not to compete.”). But see Dominion 
Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 
2004) (requiring the moving party to establish three factors in addition to ir-
reparable injury before an injunction will issue); Laidlaw, Inc. v. Student 
Transp. of Am., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 727, 751 (D.N.J. 1998) (same). 
 26. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at 358–59 (discussing the enforce-
ment of covenants not to compete). 
 27. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 131 (5th ed. 1998) 
(noting that breach of contract is in some cases efficient, not opportunistic). 
 28. See id. at 132–33. 
 29. See, e.g., Freund v. Wash. Square Press, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 419, 422 
(N.Y. 1974) (awarding nominal damages when the value of the plaintiff ’s 
royalties—i.e., his expectation damages—was indeterminate). 
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promisee in the position she would have been in had the con-
tract been performed.30 
From an economic perspective, specific performance can 
encourage more efficient outcomes. In their seminal article on 
legal remedies, Calabresi and Melamed argue that any legal 
entitlement can be protected by either a liability rule, a proper-
ty rule, or an inalienability rule.31 Liability rules allow parties 
to violate a legal right so long as they pay damages, while 
property rules affirmatively require that parties not violate le-
gal rights on pain of criminal prosecution or contempt of 
court.32 Hence, contract damages constitute a liability regime, 
while specific enforcement is a property rule. According to Ca-
labresi and Melamed, a liability rule functions best when it is 
costly for parties to bargain with one another so that the “mar-
ket valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient.”33 When 
transaction costs are relatively low, a property rule promotes 
economic efficiency regardless of its allocation because parties 
can simply bargain to a Pareto optimal outcome.34 Contracts by 
definition involve situations where transaction costs are low 
enough that parties have already bargained with one another. 
Therefore, specific performance—a property rule—is unlikely to 
lead to inefficient outcomes because, if it leaves the promisee 
with a right to performance that is of greater value to the 
promisor, the promisor can simply pay the promisee to give it 
up.35 In short, the difficulty of accurately calculating damages 
and the possibility of economically efficient negotiation ex post 
counsels in favor of specific performance. 
Evaluating the ultimate merits of these trends and argu-
ments is beyond the scope of this Article. They indicate, howev-
er, that there is a powerful prima facie case in favor of specific 
performance in general. Notwithstanding these developments, 
however, the per se rule against specific performance of per-
sonal service contracts has remained firmly entrenched in the 
common law. Asking whether specific performance should be 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1089 (1972). 
 32. See id. at 1092. 
 33. Id. at 1110. 
 34. See id. at 1093–98. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (setting forth the argument for what later came 
to be called Coase’s Theorem). 
 35. See POSNER, supra note 27, at 146.  
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available as a remedy in at least some of these cases is mea-
ningless so long as the specter of a Thirteenth Amendment ban 
occupies the field. The Constitution acts as a “conversation-
stopper,” foreclosing a potentially fruitful discussion before it 
has begun.36 The goal of this Article is to show that, despite the 
conventional wisdom, the field of specific performance is not 
fully occupied by the Constitution. A tour through previous 
treatments of the Thirteenth Amendment and the methodology 
adopted in this Article follows. 
B. ARGUING OVER THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The Thirteenth Amendment is the unloved step-child of the 
Reconstruction additions to the Constitution, receiving far less 
attention than the Fourteenth Amendment, which has been the 
focus of exhaustive judicial and scholarly commentary. Like the 
Third Amendment, it is apparently so successful at suppressing 
a particular evil as to seem anachronistic. A small but impor-
tant body of literature on the Amendment shows that such a 
view, however, is mistaken. The first thread of commentary in 
the literature focuses on race and what role, if any, the Thir-
teenth Amendment might play as either a fount of legislative 
authority for civil rights laws or as an independent source of 
substantive rights against various forms of racial subordina-
tion. The second conversation looks beyond race to the possibili-
ty of using the Thirteenth Amendment as a vehicle for combat-
ing a broader range of social ills. Ultimately, this Article is 
more at home in the second conversation. In contrast to this li-
terature, however, I use a more rigorously textualist and origi-
nalist analysis of the Thirteenth Amendment, which leads me 
to adopt a narrower interpretation of its terms, at least as they 
apply to the specific performance of personal service contracts. 
Much of the discussion regarding race and the Thirteenth 
Amendment has focused on Section 2, which states that “Con-
 
 36. In a sense, the constitutional claim acts as an authority that renders 
any discussion of specific performance of personal-service contracts purely hy-
pothetical. As Joseph Raz has observed: 
There is a sense in which if one accepts the legitimacy of an authority 
one is committed to following it blindly. One can be very watchful that 
it shall not overstep its authority and be sensitive to the presence of 
non-excluded considerations. But barring these possibilities, one is to 
follow the authority regardless of one’s view of the merits of the case 
(that is, blindly). One may form a view on the merits but so long as 
one follows the authority this is an academic exercise of no practical 
importance. 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 24–25 (1979). 
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gress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.”37 This provision has undergone an evolution from a 
narrow to more expansive reading by the Supreme Court. Im-
mediately after the Civil War, Congress exercised this enforce-
ment power and passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to combat 
racial discrimination against former slaves.38 In 1883, the Su-
preme Court held in the Civil Rights Cases that Congress had 
exceeded its authority under Section 2.39 The Court denied that 
discrimination against African-Americans was a “badge of sla-
very,” concluding that its suppression did not come within con-
gressional enforcement power.40 A decade and a half later, the 
Court effectively ended any hope of using the Thirteenth 
Amendment as a weapon against racial subordination when it 
held in Plessy v. Ferguson that state laws requiring racial se-
gregation have “no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the 
two races, or reëstablish a state of involuntary servitude.”41 
Despite these decisions, scholars and activists concerned 
with racial equality continued to focus their attention on reviv-
ing the Thirteenth Amendment as a vehicle for combating dis-
crimination. Hence, during the 1930s and 1940s, progressive 
lawyers in the Justice Department and the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People experimented with 
using the Thirteenth Amendment to attack Jim Crow.42 In the 
1950s, Jacobus tenBroek launched a scholarly attack on the 
Court’s reasoning in the Civil Rights Cases, showing that the 
Reconstruction Congress that passed the Thirteenth Amend-
ment understood its enforcement powers under Section 2 of the 
Amendment to reach far more widely than the Court had 
held.43 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court in effect vin-
dicated tenBroek’s position, holding that Section 2 “clothed 
‘Congress with the power to pass all laws necessary and proper 
for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United 
States’” and that “Congress has the power [] to determine what 
 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. 
 38. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)).  
 39. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
 40. See id. at 21. 
 41. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896). 
 42. See generally Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the 
Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609 (2001). 
 43. See Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 173 (1951). 
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are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority 
to translate that determination into effective legislation.”44 As 
the Supreme Court has seemed to limit congressional authority 
to pass civil rights legislation using the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the commerce power in recent years,45 some commen-
tators have suggested a return to the Thirteenth Amendment 
as a basis for such authority, pointing to the broad congres-
sional power apparently sanctioned in Jones.46 
In addition to the work on race, a number of scholars have 
looked to the Thirteenth Amendment as a constitutional reme-
dy against a wide variety of evils such as oppressive labor con-
ditions overseas,47 the plight of immigrant workers,48 violence 
against women,49 and mail-order brides.50 A detailed summary 
of this literature is beyond the scope of this Article, but a brief 
review of a few examples will help to situate my argument 
within the debate over the Thirteenth Amendment’s meaning. 
Scholars have suggested that the Thirteenth Amendment 
prohibits conditions analogous to slavery. In DeShaney v. Win-
nebago County Department of Social Services, the Supreme 
Court ruled that a child who was severely brain damaged by a 
violent and abusive father had no cause of action against the 
 
 44. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439–40 (1968) (quoting 
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20). 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking 
down a portion of the Violence Against Women Act as exceeding Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause powers); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (finding that the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act “exceed[ed] Congress’ authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”). 
 46. See, e.g., ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
AMERICAN FREEDOM 131–36 (2004). 
 47. See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and 
Slavery in the Global Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 973 (2002). 
 48. See generally Maria L. Ontiversos, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and 
the Thirteenth Amendment: Challenging Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 923, 923 (2007); Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers and the Thir-
teenth Amendment (June 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017066. 
 49. See generally Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Le-
gal History of, and Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging Dis-
parities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 1 (2006); Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, Comment, A 
Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1097, 1098–101 (1998). 
 50. See generally Suzanne H. Jackson, Marriages of Convenience: Interna-
tional Marriage Brokers, “Mail-Order Brides,” and Domestic Servitude, 38 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 895, 920 (2007); Suzanne H. Jackson, To Honor and Obey: Traf-
ficking in “Mail-Order Brides,” 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475, 568–69 (2002). 
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state officials who knowingly did nothing to protect him.51 Ak-
hil Amar and Daniel Widawsky turned to the Thirteenth 
Amendment as a possible way around the Court’s holding.52 
They noted that the Thirteenth Amendment contains no state 
action requirement—the central issue in DeShaney.53 Their ar-
gument was that extreme child abuse constituted a condition 
similar to slavery, giving DeShaney a cause of action even in 
the absence of any direct involvement by state officials.54 They 
looked at the legislative history of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
slave narratives depicting the conditions under slavery, and 
subsequent judicial construction of the Amendment.55 Ulti-
mately, they concluded that the Amendment was meant to 
reach beyond the de jure abolition of chattel slavery to any con-
dition that was substantially analogous to slavery.56 Interes-
tingly, however, their argument made no attempt to distin-
guish between the meaning of “slavery” and “involuntary 
servitude.”57 
In the context of labor law, James Gray Pope has argued 
that American law should have grounded congressional author-
ity to pass labor laws in the Thirteenth Amendment instead of 
making the mistake of basing these laws in the commerce pow-
er.58 Adopting what he calls “popular constitutionalism,”59 
Pope’s approach is to recover the constitutional arguments put 
forward by labor leaders in the years before the New Deal.60 
These thinkers argued that anti-union measures such as labor 
injunctions,61 yellow dog contracts,62 and anti-closed shop 
 
 51. 489 U.S. 189, 191–203 (1989). 
 52. Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A 
Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1376–
78 (1992). 
 53. Id. at 1368. 
 54. Id. at 1381–82. 
 55. Id. at 1366. 
 56. Id. at 1384. 
 57. Id. at 1377. 
 58. James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce 
Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1, 3–7 (2002). 
 59. Id. at 4; see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 6–7 (1991) (arguing 
that, in times of heightened constitutional politics, democratic action sets the 
contours of constitutional law); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 
3–8 (2004) (discussing the constitutional validity of popular constitutional ar-
guments as opposed to elite legal constitutional arguments); Pope, supra note 
58, at 10 n.30 (citing ACKERMAN, supra, at 6–7). 
 60. See Pope, supra note 58, at 7. 
 61. See id. at 14. 
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laws63 constituted a kind of slavery. Accordingly, they insisted 
that in some instances the Thirteenth Amendment itself guar-
anteed pro-union legal outcomes64 and that Congress had pow-
er under Section 2 of the Amendment to pass pro-union legisla-
tion such as the Wagner Act.65 Elite progressive lawyers led by 
Felix Frankfurter, however, treated these arguments with dis-
dain, insisting that pro-union New Deal legislation had to be 
justified under the Commerce Clause.66 This move served to 
massively expand congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause while further narrowing the reach of constitutional pro-
tection for civil liberties under the Reconstruction Amend-
ments.67 It also located labor law firmly within the domain of 
economic, rather than human rights, legislation.68 Pope’s histo-
ry is structured around a declension narrative in which the 
democratically authentic constitutional voice of labor was smo-
thered by democratically inauthentic elites bent on preserving 
the power of their profession.69 Had labor’s constitutional ar-
gument been adopted, he argues, many of the distortions of 
modern constitutional law could have been avoided.70 In con-
trast to Amar and Widawsky’s attention to the original under-
standing of the scope of the Amendment, Pope grounds his pos-
itive assessment of labor’s lost “freedom constitution” in the 
mass mobilization of working-class Americans behind a consti-
tutional interpretation that they saw as protecting their free-
dom.71 As I explain in the next section, the approach adopted in 
this Article is much closer to that of Amar and Widawsky than 
to that of Pope. 
C. A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
Underlying any argument about the meaning of the Thir-
teenth Amendment is an approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion. In order to make this Article’s discussion—particularly 
the historical discussion—easier to follow, it is important to lay 
 
 62. See id. at 21–22. 
 63. See id. at 99. 
 64. See id. at 17–25. 
 65. See id. at 46–47. 
 66. See id. at 25–26. 
 67. See id. at 3. 
 68. See id. at 102. 
 69. See id. at 112–13. 
 70. See id. at 115–19. 
 71. See id. at 15–18. 
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some theoretical cards on the table. The goal in doing so is not 
to defend a particular interpretative methodology but rather to 
help readers evaluate these arguments in light of the admitted-
ly controversial methodology this Article has adopted. 
The argument herein is essentially textualist and original-
ist.72 It is textualist for two reasons. First, it assumes that the 
constitutional text provides the surest guide to correct constitu-
tional meaning. Second, it assumes that the constitutional ar-
gument against specific performance of personal service con-
tracts turns on the meaning of the term “involuntary servitude” 
in the Thirteenth Amendment. Being required to perform ser-
vices according to the terms of a contract is not the same thing 
as slavery. For example, it does not involve the enslavement of 
one’s children or render one’s person liable to being bought or 
sold.73 To be sure, one might argue that specific performance of 
such contracts is morally objectionable in ways similar to sla-
very.74 The text of the Thirteenth Amendment, however, al-
ready contemplates the prohibition of objectionable forms of la-
bor that do not rise to the level of chattel slavery with the term 
“involuntary servitude.” Hence, it is to the meaning of this term 
that we must turn if we are to evaluate the constitutional case 
for the per se rule against specific performance of personal ser-
vice contracts. 
The meaning of the constitutional text is best derived from 
the public meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment at the time 
of its adoption. Hence, this Article does not attempt to provide 
a narrative of the political, intellectual, and social forces that 
called the Thirteenth Amendment into being.75 It also does not 
 
 72. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional 
Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007); Randy E. Barnett, An Original-
ism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, Se-
mantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series No. 
07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1120244. Obviously the methodology they, and I, adopt here is controver-
sial. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
(2009); Stephen Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185. 
 73. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
131 (1989) (“Because they were ‘chattels personal,’ slaves could be bought, 
sold, leased, used as collateral, bequeathed to subsequent generations, and 
even freed. In its crudest form, the slave law of the antebellum South simply 
categorized black human beings as property assets. As in the colonial era, 
slave status was perpetual and inherited through the mother.”). 
 74. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 179, 179–80 (1986). 
 75. See, e.g., MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE 
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001) (providing 
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explore the original intentions of the authors of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.76 I am interested in history only to the extent that 
it provides the context in which we can grasp the original se-
mantic content of the term “involuntary servitude.”77 
This Article also assumes, however, that there is what 
Lawrence Solum has called a linguistic division of labor, so that 
in looking for the original meaning of a particular term, we are 
not concerned simply with what the person on the street would 
have thought.78 Some language acquires a specific, technical le-
gal meaning.79 As Blackstone put it, such terms of art “must be 
taken according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, 
trade, and science.”80 In particular, when the Constitution in-
cludes words from another legal text that had been subject to 
judicial interpretation, we may assume—in the absence of 
strong contrary evidence—that the words are best understood 
by reference to the pre-existing legal gloss.81 
 
a detailed political history of the events leading up to the adoption of the Thir-
teenth Amendment). 
 76. E.g., VanderVelde, supra note 9 (reconstructing the aspirations and 
intentions of abolitionist supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment). Ultimate-
ly, I believe the text that was chosen mediates the conflicts between, and com-
promises among, many competing intentions. Furthermore, we cannot know 
the intentions of every person who participated in the enactment of the 
Amendment. Neither can we assume this group had a single coherent set of 
intentions. See Solum, supra note 72, at 109 (“Although expected applications 
can be evidence of meaning, they cannot be the meaning of a constitutional 
provision.”); infra text accompanying notes 172–90. 
 77. Cf. Paul Brest, The Misconcieved Quest for the Original Understand-
ing, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 214 (1980) (“If the only way a judge could ascertain 
institutional intent were to count individual intention-votes, her task would be 
impossible even with respect to a single multimember law-making body, and a 
fortiori where the assent of several such bodies were required.”). 
 78. See Solum, supra note 72, at 54–56 (discussing terms of art and the 
linguistic division of labor). 
 79. For example, a “letter of marque” has a very specific meaning within 
the eighteenth-century laws of war, and in construing the term in the Consti-
tution we must understand that meaning. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting 
to Congress the power to issue “letters of marque”). 
 80. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59. 
 81. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301–04 (2001) (construing the scope 
of habeas corpus protection under the Constitution by reference to practice 
“[i]n England prior to 1789, in the Colonies, and in this Nation during the 
formative years of our Government”); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 
425, 473–74 (1977) (construing the term “bill of attainder” in the Constitution 
by reference to the meaning of this legal term in preadoption legal materials); 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (1798) (noting that the term “ex post 
facto” in the Constitution was used with knowledge that “the parliament of 
Great Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass such laws . . . . [t]o pre-
vent such and similar acts . . . [and that] the federal and state legislatures 
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In understanding language, our goal is to clarify for our-
selves obscurities in a particular communicative act. Language 
can be obscure in two ways. It can be either ambiguous, mean-
ing that it is susceptible to multiple meanings, or vague, mean-
ing that the terms used are inherently indeterminate.82 We can 
parse ambiguous language by determining from context which 
specific meaning of the term is being used. Vague language, on 
the other hand, must be understood through either a value 
judgment or some kind of functional analysis. When a term in 
the Constitution is ambiguous, originalism suggests that its 
meaning can be resolved as a matter of linguistic fact by look-
ing at the original public understanding of the term. As this Ar-
ticle seeks to show below, as applied to virtually all cases of 
specific performance, the term “involuntary servitude” is ambi-
guous rather than vague. Hence, the Article is concerned en-
tirely with constitutional interpretation—that is, a recovery of 
the original public meaning of “involuntary servitude”—and it 
does not offer a constitutional construction of “involuntary ser-
vitude.” 
Finally, while its arguments are textualist and originalist, 
this Article does not assume a stance of original meaning über 
alles. While the semantic content of the constitutional text 
must be at the center of an analysis of constitutional meaning, 
due respect for the values of stability and continuity counsel in 
favor of giving deference to established precedent. Hence, the 
Article also examines how the Supreme Court has construed 
the term. To date, the Court has not developed a clear doctrinal 
structure for analyzing claims of “involuntary servitude.” How-
ever, the outcomes and circumstances of the cases the Court 
has decided are broadly consistent with the original under-
standing of the term. 
 
were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder, or any ex post facto law”). 
 82. Of course it is possible for a word to be both vague and ambiguous, 
depending on the context in which it is used. For example, when I make a face 
after smelling a jug of milk, and my wife asks me if it is “good,” the term has a 
determinate, nonvague meaning, although given the multiple possible mean-
ings that the word “good” has, a speaker without a knowledge of milk’s ten-
dency to go sour might be confused. On the other hand, when someone claims 
that “Richard Nixon was a good president,” their use of the term “good” is va-
gue in that the truth of their statement turns on substantive judgments rather 
than semantic facts. Likewise, if I go into Starbucks and order a “tall” hot 
chocolate, the term is ambiguous because it might refer to a drink that is tall 
as opposed to short, or it might refer to a Tall drink as opposed to a Venti or a 
Grande drink. On the other hand, if I say “Richard Nixon was tall,” the term is 
vague. Tall for what purposes or compared to whom? 
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III.  THE MEANING OF “INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE” 
BEFORE THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT   
The term “involuntary servitude” had a long history before 
it was incorporated into the Thirteenth Amendment. The first 
bill calling for a constitutional amendment banning slavery was 
submitted in December 1863 to the Senate, and on February 
10, 1864, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported language 
that would ultimately be adopted as the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.83 However, in coupling the prohibition against slavery 
with one against “involuntary servitude,” the framers of the 
Amendment were adopting a legal term with more than seven-
ty years of history. Hence, in construing the meaning of this 
term, we first look to the treatment of the term prior to the 
adoption of the Amendment. 
A. THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 
The drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment lifted the 
phrase, “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude” verbatim 
from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which was passed by 
the Confederation Congress to govern the territory north of the 
Ohio River ceded to the United States at the end of the Revolu-
tion.84 As early as 1782, officers in the Continental Army began 
lobbying Congress to provide veterans with western land.85 In 
April 1783, they presented Congress with a number of proposi-
tions regarding the creation of a new state in the nation’s west-
ern territories,86 including Proposition 11, which called for “the 
total exclusion of slavery from the State to form an essential 
and irrevocable part” of the constitution of their proposed com-
monwealth.87 In April 1784, a congressional committee chaired 
by Thomas Jefferson produced a report suggesting: 
[A]fter the year 1800 of the Christian era there shall be neither sla-
very nor involuntary servitude in any of the said states [of the 
Northwest Territory], otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whe-
reof the party shall have been duly convicted to have been personally 
guilty.88 
 
 83. TSESIS, supra note 46, at 38–39. 
 84. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, 1 Stat. 50 
(1789), reprinted in 1 U.S.C. at LV (2006) [hereinafter Northwest Ordinance]. 
 85. JAY A. BARRETT, EVOLUTION OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787, at 6–7 (Arno 
Press 1971) (1891). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 8. 
 88. Id. at 22. The report is reproduced in full in John M. Merriam, The 
Legislative History of the Ordinance of 1787, 5 PROC. AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y 
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Under pressure from Southern delegates, the ban on sla-
very was dropped, but three years later when Congress passed 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, its sponsors revived Jeffer-
son’s language.89 Consistent with the requirements of the Or-
dinance, the constitutions of all of the states carved out of the 
Northwest Territory—Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and 
Wisconsin—contained prohibitions on both slavery and “invo-
luntary servitude.”90 Other states followed, and, prior to the 
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, fourteen states already 
had constitutional provisions—some of them adopted at the in-
stigation of occupying federal troops during the Civil War—
outlawing “involuntary servitude.”91 Hence, far from inventing 
 
303, 308–10 (1888). 
 89. See Northwest Ordinance, supra note 84, art. VI. The article reads in 
its entirety: 
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said 
territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted: Provided always, that any per-
son escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully 
claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawful-
ly reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or 
service as aforesaid. 
Id. There is a lively historical debate about why Jefferson’s language was ul-
timately reinserted, as the change was supported by southern delegates to 
Congress. One possibility was that the language was meant to protect south-
ern states from competition by precluding the creation of slave-facilitated mo-
noculture north of the Ohio River. Another possibility is that by excluding sla-
very from the northwest, southern delegates were strengthening the hold of 
slavery in the southwest. See generally Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the 
Northwest Ordinance: A Study in Ambiguity, 6 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 343 (1986); 
J. David Griffin, Historians and the Sixth Article of The Ordinance of 1787, 78 
OHIO HIST. 253 (1969); Staughton Lynd, The Compromise of 1787, 81 POL. SCI. 
Q. 225 (1966). 
 90. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude shall hereafter be introduced into this state, otherwise than for the pu-
nishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted . . . .”); 
IND. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (“There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude in this State, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted . . . .”); MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“Nei-
ther slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever be introduced into this state, 
except for the punishment of crimes of which the party shall have been duly 
convicted.”); OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“There shall be neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude in this state, otherwise than for the punishment of 
crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted . . . .”). 
 91. See ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude 
shall hereafter exist in this state, otherwise than punishment for crime, whe-
reof the party shall have been convicted by due process of law . . . .”); CAL. 
CONST. § 18 (“Neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude, unless for punish-
ment of crimes, shall ever be tolerated in this State.”); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 23 
(“There shall be no slavery in this state; nor shall there be involuntary servi-
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a new phrase, the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment 
adopted a legal term of art with a long history. 
B. THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN SLAVERY AND CONTRACT IN THE 
LAW OF THE OLD NORTHWEST 
The earliest gloss on the term “involuntary servitude” ap-
pears in Ohio’s 1802 constitution. After recapitulating the 
Northwest Ordinance’s prohibition on slavery and “involuntary 
servitude,” that constitution further provided two specific pro-
hibitions aimed at limiting the enforcement of certain kinds of 
contracts. First, it stated that “nor shall any male person, ar-
rived at the age of twenty-one years, or female person arrived 
at the age of eighteen years, be held to serve any person as a 
servant, under the pretence of indenture or otherwise, unless 
such person shall enter into such indenture while in a state of 
perfect freedom, and on condition of a bona fide consideration 
received, or to be received, for their service . . . .”92 Second, the 
constitution singled out African-Americans for special protec-
tion, stating that “[n]or shall any indenture of any negro or mu-
latto, hereafter made and executed out of the state, or if made 
in the state, where the term of service exceeds one year, be of 
the least validity . . . .”93 
The first of these Ohio prohibitions was adapted from the 
Vermont constitution of 1777.94 In all likelihood, the choice was 
 
tude, unless for the punishment of crime.”), KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 6 
(“There shall be no slavery in this state; and no involuntary servitude, except 
for the punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed.”); LA. CONST. art. I (“Slavery and involuntary servitude, except as pu-
nishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, are he-
reby forever abolished and prohibited throughout the State.”); MINN. CONST. 
art. I, § 2 (“There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the 
State otherwise than as punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted.”); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 17 (“Neither Slavery nor involun-
tary servitude unless for punishment of crimes shall ever be tolerated in this 
State.”); ORE. CONST. art. I, § 34 (“There shall be neither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude in this state, otherwise than as a punishment for crime, whe-
reof the party shall have been duly convicted.”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 33 
(“That slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, are forever prohibited in 
this State.”). 
 92. OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1 (“Therefore, no male person, born in this 
country, or brought from over sea, ought to be holden by law, to serve any per-
son, as a servant, slave or apprentice, after he arrives to the age of twenty-one 
years; nor female, in like manner, after she arrives to the age of eighteen 
years, unless they are bound by their own consent, after they arrive to such 
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not accidental, as Vermont was the first state to declare that its 
constitution banned slavery.95 The Ohio constitution, however, 
showed subtle shifts in emphasis. Both documents categorically 
banned contracts “to be held in service” by minors.96 Whereas 
the Vermont document simply prohibited adults from binding 
themselves to service unless “they are bound by their own con-
sent,” the Ohio constitution required that such contracts be en-
tered into “while in a state of perfect freedom.”97 Likewise, the 
Vermont constitution contemplated the legitimacy of a person 
being “holden by law, to serve . . . for the payment of debts, 
damages, fines, costs, or the like,” whereas the Ohio constitu-
tion allowed a person to “be held to serve any person as a ser-
vant” only “on a condition of a bona fide consideration.”98 
Both provisions were written against the colonial and early 
American background of indentured servitude where a servant 
was subject to criminal penalties if he refused to work as prom-
ised.99 Hence, where Vermont was willing to impose servitude 
as a remedy for debt and other liabilities, Ohio laid special em-
phasis on the importance of freely entered into agreements and 
adequate consideration, ruling out service based on a legal sta-
tus such as debt.100 Notably, the Ohio constitution’s gloss on 
“involuntary servitude” did not limit the remedy available for 
 
age, or bound by law, for the payment of debts, damages, fines, costs, or the 
like.”). 
 95. See James Oakes, “The Compromising Expedient”: Justifying a Pros-
lavery Constitution, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2023, 2027 (1996) (“Vermont . . . flat-
ly abolished slavery without fanfare in its 1777 constitution and, less than a 
decade later, its legislature reinforced emancipation with a comprehensive 
implementation statute.”). 
 96. See OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1. 
 97. See OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1. 
 98. See OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1. 
 99. See generally ABBOT EMERSON SMITH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE: WHITE 
SERVITUDE AND CONVICT LABOR IN AMERICA, 1607–1776, at 264–78 (1947). 
Although most often associated with the colonial period, indentured servitude 
continued well into the nineteenth century. ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, 
CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 29–30 (2001). La-
bor historian Robert J. Steinfeld writes: 
After the American Revolution, important changes began to take 
place in American life. During the early years of the nineteenth cen-
tury, Congress closed the slave trade to Americans. Until 1820, how-
ever, Americans continued to import large numbers of indentured 
servants and contract laborers whenever the international situation 
permitted it. But in 1820 the market in imported servants collapsed. 
Thereafter, between 1820 and 1830, relatively few adult white ser-
vants were imported, and after the early 1830s, none were. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 100.  OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2. 
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breach of an obligation to serve but only insisted that the obli-
gations flow from genuine agreements.101 
The second additional prohibition in Ohio’s constitution 
was aimed at a frequently used method of circumventing state 
prohibitions on slavery. When a slaveholder took his slave into 
a free state, the slaveholder and the slave would enter into a 
long-term indenture contract under which the slave would “vo-
luntarily” agree to serve his or her master. Ohio simply invali-
dated any such agreement in which the term extended beyond 
a year and categorically refused to recognize indenture agree-
ments made by African-Americans in other states.102 The Ohio 
Supreme Court provided a further gloss on the distinction be-
tween slavery and “involuntary servitude” that emphasized 
both consideration and length of service: 
The prohibition [in the Ohio constitution] is against slavery and invo-
luntary servitude as a state and condition of man in Ohio. The slavery 
prohibited consists in the right of one person to hold another person 
and his posterity in perpetual bondage to labor in Ohio, without com-
pensation, save the reciprocal obligation of the master to support his 
slave. And the involuntary servitude inhibited is the same thing, with 
the exception, that the bondage may not be for the entire life of the 
servant, nor involve his posterity.103 
While the constitutional provisions of other states carved 
out of the Northwest Territory provided no additional gloss on 
“involuntary servitude,”104 the courts of both Illinois and Indi-
ana grappled with the meaning of “involuntary servitude” in 
the years prior to the Civil War. In 1821, the Indiana Supreme 
Court decided the case of In re Mary Clark.105 In 1816, Clark 
had “voluntarily bound herself to serve” a man named Johnson 
 
 101.  Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 622, 690–91 (1856) (emphasis add-
ed) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Compare IND. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (“There shall be neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude in this State, otherwise than for the punishment of 
crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted . . . .”), and MICH. 
CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever be 
introduced into this state, except for the punishment of crimes of which the 
party shall have been duly convicted.”), with OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2 
(“There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in this state . . . , 
unless such person shall enter into such indenture while in a state of perfect 
freedom, and on condition of a bona fide consideration . . . .”). 
 105. In re Clark, 1 Blackf. 122 (Ind. 1821); see also Sandra Boyd Williams, 
The Indiana Supreme Court and the Struggle Against Slavery, 30 IND. L. REV. 
305, 307–09 (1997) (discussing the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in In re 
Clark). 
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for a period of twenty years.106 She subsequently sued for a writ 
of habeas corpus, asking that she be released from his ser-
vice.107 According to the court, the question presented was 
“whether her service, although involuntary in fact, shall not be 
considered voluntary by operation of law, being performed un-
der an indenture voluntarily executed.”108 The court initially 
approached the case as one where “the obligee requires a specif-
ic performance.”109 This move allowed it to point out that under 
the common law, it could not specifically enforce the contract.110 
It supported this non-constitutional rule by reference to the 
classical equitable arguments against specific performance in 
such cases.111 
The court, however, extended its analysis beyond these 
traditional arguments to take some account of the reality of the 
relationship between Clark and Johnson. “[A] covenant for ser-
vice,” wrote the court, “might, as in the case before us, require a 
number of years. Such a performance, if enforced by law, would 
produce a state of servitude as degrading and demoralizing in 
its consequences, as a state of absolute slavery . . . .”112 Fur-
thermore, the court noted that Johnson was not actually asking 
for a court order forcing Clark to serve under the indenture 
agreement.113 Rather, having no way of obtaining such an or-
der, Johnson was personally forcing Clark to work under the 
contract.114 The court wrote: 
Deplorable indeed would be the state of society, if the obligee in every 
contract had a right to seize the person of the obligor, and force him to 
comply with his undertaking. . . . We may, therefore, unhesitatingly 
conclude, that when the law will not directly coerce a specific perfor-
mance, it will not leave a party to exercise the law of the strong, and 
coerce it in his own behalf. A state of servitude thus produced, either 
by direct or permissive coercion, would not be considered voluntary 
either in fact or in law.115 
 
 106. In re Clark, 1 Blackf. at 122–23.  
 107. Id. at 122. 
 108. Id. at 123.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. The court, however, went on to acknowledge that under certain 
circumstances—such as apprenticeship agreements or “[t]he case of soldiers 
and sailors”—the courts would require specific performance of personal obliga-
tions to work. Id. at 123–24. 
 111. Id. at 124. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 125. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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In re Clark has been read as holding that whenever a per-
son no longer wishes to perform under a contract for personal 
service any order that he or she continue performance would 
constitute “involuntary servitude.”116 The court’s analysis, how-
ever, was more nuanced than this account suggests. It focused 
on the conditions that would result were Clark forced to per-
form under a long-term agreement with Johnson.117 Perhaps 
more importantly, the court distinguished Clark’s relationship 
with Johnson from that of an ordinary worker with her em-
ployer by the fact that Johnson claimed the right to personally 
force Clark to perform, without any state intervention. Making 
the comparison explicit, the court wrote: 
If a man, contracting to labor for another a day, a month, a year, or a 
series of years, were liable to be taken by his adversary, and com-
pelled to perform the labor, it would either put a stop to all such con-
tracts, or produce in their performance a state of domination in the 
one party, and abject humiliation in the other.118 
In such a case it was apparently not the fact that a worker 
was compelled to work under the contract that produced “invo-
luntary servitude.” Rather, it was that the master had a per-
sonal right to physically dominate the servant. The point is 
supported by the court’s conditioning of its conclusion about 
“involuntary servitude” on the assumption that “the law will 
not directly coerce specific performance.”119 In other words, be-
cause the common law did not allow the court to order specific 
performance, the only way to force Clark to perform would be to 
license self-help violence by her master, which would produce 
“involuntary servitude.”120 Seen in this light, the Indiana 
court’s approach to “involuntary servitude” is largely consistent 
with that taken by Ohio. In re Clark, however, looks not simply 
at the length of the relationship, but also the extent to which it 
involves one party’s exercise of complete dominion over the oth-
er party. In the case of Clark, the master’s claimed right to 
physically prevent her departure and personally force her to 
work was sufficient evidence of such domination.121 
 
 116. See STEINFELD, supra note 99, at 263 (“Here, the legal right to with-
draw from the labor relationship at any time the laborer wished marked the 
boundary between ‘free labor’ and ‘involuntary servitude.’”). 
 117. See In re Clark, 1 Blackf. at 125. 
 118. Id. (emphasis added). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. at 124 (noting that the remedy of specific enforcement would 
result in the master’s complete and unchecked dominion over the servant). 
 121. Id. at 125–26. 
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The treatment of “involuntary servitude” under the Illinois 
constitution was more complicated. Anti-slavery sentiment was 
weaker in Illinois than in the other states of the Northwest 
Territory, and this more accommodating attitude was reflected 
in its constitution.122 Indeed, the Northwest Ordinance never 
fully excluded slavery from Illinois, even while it was a territo-
ry.123 Pre-Ordinance settlers brought in slaves prior to 1787, 
and under the terms of Virginia’s cession of the territory to the 
federal government, the rights of these masters in their slaves 
were deemed to be excluded from the Northwest Ordinance’s 
prohibition on slavery.124 
The enabling act for Illinois required a new constitution 
that was “not repugnant to” the Northwest Ordinance of 
1787.125 Initially, the constitutional convention adopted a pro-
vision exactly mirroring Ohio’s prohibition on slavery and “in-
voluntary servitude,” including its limitations on the enforce-
ment of indenture agreements.126 In the final version of the 
constitution, however, the slavery provision was amended to 
read, “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude shall hereaf-
ter be introduced in this state,” grandfathering in the rights of 
current slave owners.127 The rights of masters under previous 
indenture agreements were similarly protected. Hence, the 
language borrowed from the Ohio constitution limiting the en-
forceability of indentured agreements by “any negro or mulat-
to” was modified so that it applied only to those “hereafter 
made.”128 More strikingly, a separate provision said that “[e]ach 
and every person who has been bound to service by contract or 
indenture in virtue of the laws of the Illinois territory hereto-
fore existing . . . shall be held to a specific performance of their 
 
 122. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1; PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: 
SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 149 (1981) (“In Ohio antislavery senti-
ment grew to be quite strong . . . , [but i]n Illinois, on the other hand, few anti-
slavery politicians reached positions of power before the late 1850s.”).  
 123. See JANET CORNELIUS, A HISTORY OF CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLI-
NOIS 1–2 (1969) (discussing slavery under the territorial government). 
 124.  See id. 
 125. An Act to enable the people of the Illinois Territory to form a constitu-
tion and State government, and for the admission of such State into the Union 
on an equal footing with the original States, Ch. 67, § 4, 3 Stat. 428, 430 
(1818). 
 126. CORNELIUS, supra note 123, at 8 (discussing the legislative history of 
the 1818 constitution’s slavery provision). 
 127. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (emphasis added); see also CORNELIUS, supra 
note 123, at 9. 
 128. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1; CORNELIUS, supra note 123, at 8–9. 
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contracts or indentures.”129 When the proposed Illinois consti-
tution was presented to Congress in 1818, it contained a 
preamble asserting that it was consistent with the 1787 law,130 
but antislavery senators claimed that it violated the Northwest 
Ordinance.131 In the end, however, Illinois was accepted into 
the Union despite its compromised prohibition on slavery. 
In 1807, the territory of Indiana passed a law governing 
indentured servitude that was carried into the laws of the terri-
tory of Illinois when it was divided from Indiana.132 Under the 
terms of the act, any slave owner bringing a slave into the ter-
ritory could transform his or her slave into an indentured ser-
vant by going before a local magistrate and agreeing “upon the 
term of years which the said negro or mulatto will and shall 
serve his or her said owner.”133 In 1814, a slave named Phoebe 
was taken to Illinois by her master, Joseph Jay, where she ex-
ecuted an indenture to serve him for forty years.134 Over a dec-
ade later, after ratification of the state constitution, she 
brought “an action of trespass, assault, battery, wounding, and 
false imprisonment” against Jay, arguing that the enforcement 
of her indenture agreement constituted “involuntary servitude” 
under the 1787 ordinance and the Illinois constitution.135 Jay 
admitted to “a little force and beating” but insisted that the in-
denture was valid under the Illinois constitution’s saving 
clause grandfathering in the enforceability of pre-statehood 
agreements.136 
When the case arrived in the Illinois Supreme Court in 
1828, Justice Lockwood made short work of any claim that 
 
 129. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 3. The constitution also explicitly allowed the 
use of slave labor in the salt mines of Gallatin County. See id. § 2; see also 
CORNELIUS, supra note 123, at 9 (discussing the history of Section 2 and not-
ing that it was believed at the time that white men were physically incapable 
of working under the harsh conditions in the mines). 
 130. ILL. CONST. pmbl. (“The people of the Illinois territory having the 
right of admission into the general government as a member of the union, con-
sistent with . . . the ordinance of congress of 1787 . . . do, by their representa-
tives in convention, ordain and establish the following constitution or form of 
government . . . .”). 
 131. CORNELIUS, supra note 123, at 11–12 (discussing Congressional oppo-
sition to the 1818 constitution). 
 132. STEINFELD, supra note 99, at 259–60 (discussing the passage of the 
Indiana act and its adoption by Illinois). 
 133. An Act concerning the introduction of Negroes and Mulattoes into this 
Territory, in THE LAWS OF INDIANA TERRITORY 136, 137 (Philbrick ed., 1931). 
 134. Phoebe v. Jay, 1 Ill. (Breese) 268, 268 (1828).  
 135. Id. at 268, 270. 
 136. Id. at 269–70. 
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Phoebe had “voluntarily” agreed to the 1814 contract. He wrote: 
Nothing can be conceived farther from the truth, than the idea that 
there could be a voluntary contract between the negro and his master 
. . . . I conceive that it would be an insult to common sense to contend 
that the negro, under the circumstances in which he was placed, had 
any free agency. The only choice given him was a choice of evils.137 
He went on to state explicitly that the “indenturing was in 
effect an involuntary servitude for a period of years.”138 Not-
withstanding this conclusion, however, the court upheld 
Phoebe’s indenture.139 The constitutional clause validating pre-
statehood indenture agreements, according to the court, was an 
exception to the prohibition on “involuntary servitude,” one 
that had been blessed by Congress when it accepted Illinois in-
to the Union.140 Over the succeeding years, the Illinois Su-
preme Court repeatedly followed its holding in Phoebe v. Jay.141 
Indeed, in Sarah v. Borders, the court reaffirmed that the Illi-
nois constitution imposed “involuntary servitude” upon those 
whose indentures were clearly invalid under the Northwest 
Ordinance, causing one dissenting justice to express incredulity 
that the court had construed “the constitution to make inden-
tures valid which were before void, and reduce to a state of in-
voluntary servitude, those who were legally free.”142 
Robert Steinfeld has examined the interpretation of “invo-
luntary servitude” in the jurisprudence of the states of the 
Northwest Territory and concluded that there were three ap-
proaches to determining when a contract became a species of 
“involuntary servitude.”143 In Ohio, he argues, the issue turned 
on the length of time specified in the contract.144 Requiring per-
formance of short-term contracts was not “involuntary servi-
tude,” while performance of long-term contracts was.145 In In-
diana, according to Steinfeld, the courts held that forced 
performance of any contract became “involuntary servitude” as 
 
 137. Id. at 270. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 276. 
 140. Id. at 270–72. 
 141. See, e.g., Sarah v. Borders, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 341, 346 (1843); Choisser v. 
Hargrave, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 317 (1836). 
 142. Sarah, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) at 352 (Canton, J., concurring). 
 143. See STEINFELD, supra note 99, at 256 (“Three separate and distinct 
constitutional traditions interpreting the term ‘involuntary servitude’ emerged 
. . . .”). 
 144. Id. at 257. 
 145. Id.  
 2048 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:2020 
 
soon as the party no longer wished to perform.146 Finally, in Il-
linois, he says, no contract—regardless of its length or the un-
willingness of the party to perform—could constitute “involun-
tary servitude” if it was freely entered into ab initio.147 
However, there are some problems with this neat tripartite di-
vision of approaches. For example, Steinfeld’s discussion of the 
distinction between the Illinois and Ohio approaches glosses 
over the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court held on numerous 
occasions that the enforcement of indenture agreements be-
tween slaves and their masters was a species of “involuntary 
servitude” nevertheless allowed under the state constitution. 
To be sure, he is well aware of the complex interplay of consti-
tution and territorial statutes under Illinois law, but he still 
reads the Illinois cases as offering a gloss on “involuntary servi-
tude.”148 
Read together, the jurisprudence in Ohio, Indiana, and Il-
linois shows a fairly unified approach to the question of “invo-
luntary servitude.” Rather than hanging the meaning of the 
term on a single concept, these states recognized that drawing 
the line between enforcing a contract and “involuntary servi-
tude” necessarily required a nuanced understanding of the re-
lationship between the two parties. Taken together, these ma-
terials suggest that Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana had 
determined—before the adoption of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment—that “involuntary servitude” had four basic characteris-
tics: First, it was not entered into “in a state of perfect free-
dom.”149 Second, it lacked compensation or “bona fide 
consideration.”150 Third, it extended over a long period of time 
that exceeded at least a year but could be less than the entire 
life of the servant.151 Fourth, it involved complete domination 
by the master of the servant, including the right to use violence 
to coerce the servant.152 
 
 146. Id. at 263. 
 147. Id. at 260. 
 148. See id. at 259–61. 
 149.  See OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1. 
 150.  See OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1. 
 151.  OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2. 
 152. Although Illinois treated indenture agreements in a more lax fashion, 
the unified understanding of “involuntary servitude” is not undermined be-
cause the Illinois Supreme Court repeatedly held that its enforcement of 
agreements between slaves and masters was a species of involuntary servi-
tude blessed by Congress and the Illinois constitution. See, e.g., Phoebe v. Jay, 
1 Ill. (Breese) 268, 270–72 (1828). Rather, the Illinois court acknowledged the 
enforcement of territorial slave indentures to be a species of “involuntary ser-
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C. OTHER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
Prior to the Civil War, a number of other states adopted 
constitutions that prohibited “involuntary servitude.” General-
ly, these provisions were adopted with little or no debate about 
the wording or meaning of the amendments, but these conven-
tions provide further evidence as to the public meaning of “in-
voluntary servitude” in the years leading up to the adoption of 
the Thirteenth Amendment. The Iowa convention, for example, 
changed the wording of its amendment slightly to make it clear 
that only “involuntary servitude”—not slavery—could be im-
posed as a punishment for crime.153 The states that adopted 
prohibitions against “involuntary servitude” without debate, 
however, did so with the awareness that they were using lan-
guage with an established legal meaning. For example, Neva-
da’s 1864 convention copied exactly the language from Califor-
nia’s 1849 constitution because, as one delegate put it: “It now 
reads in the exact words of the California Constitution, and if it 
has been the subject of judicial investigation in that State, by 
retaining the same language we have the advantage of adopt-
ing with it such interpretation as has been given to it in that 
State.”154 
At the Minnesota convention in 1857, the proposed prohibi-
tion on slavery varied slightly from the text of the Northwest 
Ordinance.155 A delegate objected, saying: 
Now, sir, I would prefer that this section should be made to conform 
in phraseology precisely with the clause in the Ordinance of 1787. 
That clause is the point upon which the whole question of Slavery has 
clung. It is in the Constitution. It was adopted into the Wilmot Provi-
sio, and has been used so extensively the public mind is prepared for 
just that phraseology. It is true, the language used excludes Slavery 
 
vitude,” one which had the characteristics identified by the courts and consti-
tutions of the other states. Id. 
 153. See 1 THE DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE 
STATE OF IOWA 209 (1857). The original proposal read, “Neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude, unless for the punishment of crimes, shall ever be tole-
rated in this State.” Id. It was replaced with a provision reading, “There shall 
be no slavery in this State; nor shall there be involuntary servitude, unless for 
the punishment of crime.” Id. 
 154. OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 783 (1866). 
 155. The original language read, “Neither Slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude, unless for the punishment of crimes, shall ever exist or be tolerated in 
this State.” THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MINNESOTA CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION INCLUDING THE ORGANIC ACT OF THE TERRITORY 203 
(1857). 
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as effectually as any language could do it, but I would prefer that the 
language of the Ordinance of 1787 should be used . . . .156 
Accordingly, the convention adopted language exactly 
matching that of the Ordinance.157 
In some cases, however, debate over the issues not directly 
related to the meaning of “involuntary servitude” cast some 
light on how the term was understood at the time. For example, 
in 1859, Kansas—despite the small-scale civil war over slavery 
leading to its constitutional convention—adopted a provision on 
“involuntary servitude” without debate, and reserved the rhe-
torical fireworks over slavery for a proposed preamble to the 
bill of rights that sought unsuccessfully to declare that citizens 
had an “inalienable right to the control of their persons.”158 Al-
though the language was ultimately changed,159 none of the 
delegates seemed to have thought the question was disposed of 
by the language on “involuntary servitude,” suggesting a public 
understanding of the term that was consistent with some alie-
nation of control over one’s person. 
At its first constitutional convention at Monterey in 1849, 
California’s convention unanimously agreed that slavery and 
“involuntary servitude” were prohibited in the state.160 More 
contentiously, there was a proposal to exclude all freed African-
Americans from the state.161 Proponents of this measure re-
peatedly raised the specter of southern slave owners entering 
into agreements under which their slaves would agree to work 
in the California gold fields for a period of time in return for 
 
 156. Id. at 281. 
 157. The language adopted by the convention read, “There shall be neither 
Slavery nor involuntary servitude in the State, otherwise than in the punish-
ment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” Id. 
 158. See KANSAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A REPRINT OF THE PRO-
CEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITU-
TION OF KANSAS AT WYANDOTTE IN JULY, 1859, at 187, 276–86 (1920). 
 159. Id. at 276–86. It was thought by some delegates to adopt the “higher 
law” justification put forward by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in its refusal to 
enforce the Fugitive Slave Act, which required state officials to return runa-
way slaves to their masters. See id. at 279; In re Booth & Raycraft, 3 Wis. 144, 
160–61 (1854); In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13, 67–71 (1854). These cases were consoli-
dated on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 
How.) 506 (1859). The Court rejected the “higher law” justifications offered by 
the state tribunal. See id. at 525–26. Other delegates to the Kansas convention 
thought the measure was inconsistent with the idea of incarceration for crime. 
KANSAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 158, at 280–85.  
 160. See J. ROSS BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF 
CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION 43–44 (1850). 
 161. See id. at 137. 
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their freedom.162 One delegate insisted that by freeing a slave 
with a market value of “four to six hundred dollars” and paying 
“seven hundred dollars to get a slave here,” a slave owner could 
get one year of labor where “[the slave] produces, according to 
the ordinary rates in the mines, from two to six thousand dol-
lars.”163 
At the heart of this argument was the assumption that a 
slave owner could enter into a contract with his slave that 
would create an indenture valid under California law in return 
for his freedom.164 The opponents of the exclusionary provi-
sions, however, rejected this assumption, and in so doing threw 
light on the contemporary understanding of the term “involun-
tary servitude.” First, it is clear that they did not reject per se 
the possibility of entering into an enforceable indenture agree-
ment under the new constitution. One opponent of the drive to 
exclude freedmen from the new state said: 
I have yet to learn that there is any law of California by which a 
freeman can be indentured. If colored boys in the States are inden-
tured to the age of twenty-one and brought here before the expiration 
of the indenture, I suppose the indenture would be recognized; they 
would be required to serve to that period. But at the age of twenty-
one they would undoubtedly become free.165 
This delegate was even willing to enforce indentured 
agreements entered into by minor slaves outside of the state. 
As to adults, however, he said, “[t]he moment they enter our 
limits they are subject to our laws, and cease to be slaves.”166 
Another delegate was equally emphatic as to an indenture 
agreement entered into by an adult slave with his master out-
side of the state: “[T]hey are free the moment they touch the 
soil of California.”167 
Second, it is noteworthy that the proponents of excluding 
African-Americans from the state did not dispute this interpre-
tation of the ban on slavery and “involuntary servitude.” Their 
primary concern was the presence of any African-American 
within the state, an “evil” they saw as existing independently of 
the technical question of what sorts of indentures could be en-
forced under the proposed constitution.168 These debates sug-
 
 162. Id. at 137–38. 
 163. Id. at 138. 
 164. See id. at 141. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. at 139. 
 168. Id. at 137. 
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gest an understanding of “involuntary servitude” that allowed 
the possibility of indenture agreements, provided that they 
were contracted in California, but excluded the enforcement of 
indentures entered into by slaves outside of the state who were 
not in a state of freedom when they entered into the agree-
ments. This was precisely the understanding of “involuntary 
servitude” enshrined in Ohio’s 1802 constitution.169  
Finally, they understood the prohibition of “involuntary 
servitude” as not reaching minor apprentices, regardless of 
where their indenture was contracted.170 This final proviso was 
consistent with the notion that the master of a minor appren-
tice was a kind of in loco parentis, whose authority derived not 
from a contract per se but rather was analogous to the authori-
ty of a father over his own children. 
The constitution of Arkansas also included a provision out-
lawing slavery and “involuntary servitude.”171 In the spring of 
1864, while the war still raged in much of the state, a constitu-
tional convention elected by a tiny minority of Unionist voters 
met in Little Rock to draft the state constitution.172 Isaac Mur-
phy, the only man who had voted against secession at Arkan-
sas’s 1861 secession convention, was elected governor of the 
new state government.173 During his inaugural address, in 
which he suggested that the horrors inflicted on Arkansas by 
the war might be the judgment of God upon the state for the 
sin of slavery, he said: 
The colored freedman should be as fully protected in all his rights of 
life, liberty, character, and property as the white freeman. He should 
also be compelled to perform his contracts, whether with the white 
man or the colored, by legislation suitable to his condition, and to ef-
fect this object, some change in the law of evidence may be neces-
sary.174 
Murphy’s remarks evidence an understanding of “involun-
tary servitude” consistent with legislation requiring the com-
pelled performance of contracts. They also, of course, reflect a 
willingness to countenance the subordination of freed African-
 
 169. See OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2.  
 170.  See id. 
 171. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1. 
 172. See THOMAS A. DEBLACK, WITH FIRE AND SWORD: ARKANSAS, 1861-
1874, at 104–06 (2003). 
 173. Id. at 105. 
 174. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SESSIONS OF 
1864, 1864-65 AND 1865, at 18 (1870). 
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Americans.175 Given southern attitudes toward freed slaves af-
ter the Civil War and the desire of many southern whites to 
reinstitute a system of de facto slavery, any gloss they offer on 
the term “involuntary servitude” must be treated with suspi-
cion and may perhaps be disregarded entirely. Still, Murphy’s 
remarks represent at least some evidence as to the public 
meaning of “involuntary servitude.” 
Unlike other state conventions, the topic of slavery and 
emancipation proved particularly acrimonious in the drafting of 
Louisiana’s 1864 constitution. Lincoln’s Emancipation Procla-
mation had specifically exempted several Louisiana parishes 
that were occupied by Union troops when it was issued.176 
There was wide support for emancipation among the pro-Union 
delegates to the 1864 convention, which was held in federal-
occupied New Orleans, but a vocal minority insisted that loyal 
 
 175. It would be a mistake, however, to classify Murphy as an unrecon-
structed southern die hard or a prophet of Jim Crow. He was a Pennsylvania-
born lawyer. He married a Tennessee woman whose slave-owning father dis-
owned her for Murphy’s antislavery views. See JOHN I. SMITH, THE COURAGE 
OF A SOUTHERN UNIONIST: A BIOGRAPHY OF ISAAC MURPHY, GOVERNOR OF 
ARKANSAS 1864-68, at 7 (1979). He was virtually the only Arkansas politician 
who publicly supported the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he op-
posed—albeit ineffectively—the ex-Confederates who captured Arkansas poli-
tics after the war. See id. at 92–93. Murphy’s attitude toward the Fourteenth 
Amendment was complex. His biographer states: “[N]o evidence exists that 
Murphy wanted to bring the freedmen forward as fast as did the radicals [i.e. 
radical Republicans] or that he favored the Fourteenth Amendment fully.” Id. 
at 84. He was initially extremely cautious about bringing the Amendment for 
a vote, refusing to call a state ratifying convention or to call a lame-duck Un-
ionist legislature to vote on it. At the time, Murphy insisted that no Arkansas 
newspaper would print a call for a ratifying convention and that it was not 
possible to obtain a quorum, although his main concern was probably the ad-
visability of forcing passage of the amendment in the face of widespread popu-
lar opposition. See id. at 84–85. However, once ex-Confederates swept into 
power in Arkansas, he unsuccessfully pushed for passage of the Amendment 
as a way of speeding reunification with the North. Id. at 91–94. Indeed, these 
politicians viewed Murphy as the chief impediment to their “scheme for the 
restoration of the old slave-holding regime in the State.” See DEBLACK, supra 
note 172, at 146 (quoting statements of an anti-Murphy political activist in 
1866). 
 176. “Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln . . . do . . . designate as the States 
. . . in rebellion against the United States, the following . . . Louisiana, (except 
the Parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. Johns, St. Charles, St. 
James, Ascension, Assumption, Terrebonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, 
and Orleans, including the City of New-Orleans) . . . . And . . . I do order and 
declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and 
parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free . . . .” Abraham Lincoln, 
The Final Emancipation Proclamation (Sept. 22, 1862), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 424–25 (1989). 
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slave owners should be compensated.177 They made their ar-
gument with such fervor that at one point a riot broke out on 
the floor of the convention.178 As initially reported to the con-
vention by the Committee on Emancipation, the proposed con-
stitutional provision contained five sections.179 Section one es-
sentially copied the Northwest Ordinance’s prohibition on 
“slavery and involuntary servitude.”180 The remaining sections, 
however, went on to secure abolition by forbidding the legisla-
ture from passing any law “recognizing the right of property in 
man,” repealing the state’s so-called “Black Code, and legisla-
tion on the subject of slavery” and stating that “[n]o penal laws 
shall be made against persons of African descent, different from 
those enacted against white persons.”181 Finally, section five 
read: 
The Legislature shall, at its first session under this constitution, 
enact laws providing for the indenture of persons of African descent 
as apprentices to citizens of the State, on the same terms and condi-
tions as those prescribed, or which may hereafter be prescribed, for 
the apprenticing of white persons.182 
Although ultimately only the first two sections were 
adopted,183 the un-adopted language provides some gloss on 
how the term “involuntary servitude” was understood. It sought 
to protect newly freed slaves by demanding that they be subject 
to the same laws as others, rather than placing restrictions on 
particular enforcement devices.184 On the other hand, section 
 
 177. See DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION AND AMEND-
MENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 205–06 (1864) [he-
reinafter LOUISIANA DEBATES]. 
 178. See id. at 207  (“The sergeant-at-arms, with one of his assistants, ap-
proach[ed] Mr. Campbell and made a feeble attempt to pacify him, but he 
shook them off without paying them the slightest attention, until he had read 
his proviso to the end, and then he resumed his seat, and they gave up the at-
tempt to arrest him.”). 
 179. Id. at 205. 
 180. Id. (“Slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, are hereby forever 
abolished and prohibited throughout the State.”); supra note 89 and accompa-
nying text. 
 181. LOUISIANA DEBATES, supra note 177, at 205. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. at 224. 
 184. Id. at 154–55 (“You cannot make laws to restrain [freed slaves] be-
cause laws must be general. If you make any discrimination you only remove 
one system of slavery by introducing another.”). This argument was made by 
an opponent of immediate emancipation, who was seeking to show the parade 
of horribles that would result from adoption of the provisions on slavery. See 
id. 
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five contemplates “indentures”—albeit racially neutral ones—
although the delegates may have only contemplated it as apply-
ing to minors.185 At the same time, even proponents of imme-
diate emancipation acknowledged that a situation of de facto 
“peonage or slavery” could exist notwithstanding any legal pro-
hibition.186 What emerges from these debates is an understand-
ing of “involuntary servitude” as a condition that existed whe-
rever slave-like conditions existed, rather than as a prohibition 
on any particular method of enforcement. 
D. POPULAR USAGE OF THE TERM “INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE” 
Finally, non-technical uses of the term “involuntary servi-
tude” from the period immediately prior to the adoption of the 
Thirteenth Amendment also reference factors similar to those 
considered by the antebellum courts. These sources show that 
the term was used to refer to conditions short of slavery that 
could be differentiated from the enforcement of legitimate con-
tracts. For example, in his History of the United States, George 
Bancroft, a historian opposed to slavery, discussed the system 
of indentured servitude in the American colonies and drew a 
distinction between what he called “conditional servitude” and 
“involuntary servitude.”187 Conditional servitude, said Bancroft, 
was created by a contract whereby the servant promised his la-
bor in exchange for the cost of his transportation to America.188 
In addition, a distinction between slavery and “conditional ser-
vitude” lay in the length of the servitude. “The condition of ap-
prenticed servants in Virginia differed from that of slaves chief-
ly in the duration of their bondage,”189 Bancroft wrote, and he 
noted that “[o]ppression early ensued.”190 Interestingly, howev-
er, he identified this oppression with the absence of adequate 
consideration and fraud in the creation of the contract.191 Ban-
 
 185. An earlier version of Section 5 referred to “minors.” Id. at 96. 
 186. Id. at 97 (reproducing the minority report of the Committee on Eman-
cipation). 
 187. See GEORGE BANCROFT, 1 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE 
DISCOVERY OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENT 175–76 (15th ed. 1852) (discussing 
indentured servitude in Virginia). In his passage on the introduction of slavery 
into Virginia, Bancroft speaks of “the ultimate evils of slavery” and “the sad 
epoch of the introduction of negro slavery in the English colonies.” Id. at 177. 
 188. Id. at 175. 
 189. Id. at 176. 
 190. Id. at 175. 
 191. Id. (“[M]en who had been transported into Virginia at an expense of 
eight or ten pounds, were sometimes sold for forty, fifty, or even threescore 
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croft used “involuntary servitude” to refer to obligations created 
without consent. Hence, he applied the term to “Scots . . . who 
were taken in the field of Dunbar” and “royalist prisoners of the 
battle of Worcester” who as prisoners of war were transported 
to be servants in America.192 He applied the same term to Irish 
Catholics captured in anti-English insurrections and forcibly 
sent to the colonies.193 
Similarly, in his History of the State of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations, Samuel Greene Arnold lauded the co-
lonial Rhode Islanders for “the first legislative enactment in the 
history of this continent, if not of the world, for the suppression 
of involuntary servitude.”194 According to Arnold, the law in 
question did this by requiring that “no man could be held to 
service more than ten years from the time of his coming into 
the colony, at the end of which time he was to be set free.”195 
The importance of these sources lies not in the particular legal 
details they describe, but rather in the way that their authors 
use the term “involuntary servitude” to refer to relationships 
that fall short of slavery but are distinguished from ordinary 
contracts by fraudulent or coerced initiation, the absence of fair 
consideration, and an extended period of duration. Their usage 
of the term shows how popular meaning drew a rough and 
ready distinction between “involuntary servitude” and the legi-
timate enforcement of contracts that more or less paralleled the 
dividing line carved out by the courts. Indeed, even pro-slavery 
speakers used the terms in roughly the same way. For example, 
Thornton Stringfellow, a southern apologist for slavery imme-
diately prior to the Civil War, differentiated “voluntary” from 
“involuntary” servitude by noting that the former involved “sti-
pulated wages, and a specified time.”196 
 
pounds . . . and a class of men, nicknamed spirits, used to delude young per-
sons, servants and idlers, into embarking for America . . . .”). 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. at 176. 
 194. SAMUEL GREENE ARNOLD, 1 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 240 (1859). 
 195. Id. 
 196. THORNTON STRINGFELLOW, SCRIPTURAL AND STATISTICAL VIEWS IN 
FAVOR OF SLAVERY 17–18 (4th ed. 1856). Stringfellow’s discussion comes in an 
exegesis of the Bible, which he uses to defend slavery. Id. Strikingly, anti-
slavery exegetes also used the term “involuntary servitude” to describe the 
same biblical passages. Hence, John Prince, a liberal New England Universal-
ist pastor, wrote ten years before Stringfellow: 
Involuntary servitude,—the subjection of an intellectual and moral 
being to the will and caprice of another, who ranks him with goods 
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IV.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF  
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT   
The legislative history of the Thirteenth Amendment sug-
gests that the pre-Civil War understanding of the term “invo-
luntary servitude” remained in place when the provision was 
adopted. Congressmen engaged in debate over the Thirteenth 
Amendment in the spring and summer of 1864.197 After passing 
in the Senate, the Amendment initially failed to garner the ne-
cessary two-thirds majority in the House.198 After the election 
in the fall of that year, the House once more took up the pro-
posed amendment and after additional debate adopted it.199 
Not surprisingly, the precise meaning of the term “involuntary 
servitude” received very little attention during the debates. Ra-
ther, the senators and representatives spent the vast bulk of 
their time attacking or defending slavery,200 arguing over the 
effect that the Amendment would have on the still raging war 
with the Confederacy,201 the propriety of amending the Consti-
tution,202 states’ rights,203 and, not least, partisan attacks.204 
 
and chattels ; the deliberate violation of human life by process of law, 
and its direful waste in battle ;—these infernal practices, as well as 
some degrading superstitions, are sought to be defended by a direct 
appeal to the books containing a record of the Mosaic code and a his-
tory of the customs and social regulations of the patriarchs in olden 
time. 
See JOHN PRINCE, EIGHT HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL LECTURES ON THE BIBLE 
79 (1846). Universalists represented a kind of popular rationalism that re-
jected Calvinist orthodoxy and subjected scripture to a less literal and more 
“reasonable” or “rational” interpretation. See generally E. BROOKS HOLIFIELD, 
THEOLOGY IN AMERICA 218–33 (2003) (discussing Universalism in America). 
 197. VORENBERG, supra note 75, at 107–12. 
 198. Id. at 138. 
 199. See id. at 176, 207.  
 200. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 194 (1865) (statement of 
Rep. Fernando Wood) (“I now repeat the assertion, that the condition of do-
mestic servitude as existing in the southern States is the highest condition of 
which the African race is capable, and when compared with their original con-
dition on the continent from which they came is superior in all the elements of 
civilization, philanthropy, and humanity.”). 
 201. See, e.g., id. 1st Sess. app. at 126 (1864) (statement of Rep. Wheeler) 
(“I do not believe the adoption of this amendment would prolong the war one 
day.”). 
 202. See, e.g., id. 2d Sess. 214 (1865) (statement of Rep. C.A. White) (“I 
maintain, therefore, that the proposed amendment of the Constitution cannot 
be made of binding force and effect upon the States except by the ratification 
and consent of the States given in the exercise of the sovereign power of the 
States.”). 
 203. See, e.g., id. 1st Sess. 2991 (1864) (statement of Rep. Randall) (“Mr. 
Speaker, I cling to the States as a shipwrecked man clings to the plank.”). 
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A. DEBATES OVER THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The debates do provide some clues as to the meaning of 
“involuntary servitude.” The framers of the Amendment were 
aware of the provenance and long use of the term in the 
Northwest Ordinance.205 Senator Sumner of Massachusetts 
was the only person who raised any real objections to the word-
ing of the Amendment.206 He would have preferred to have 
substituted it with one modeled on the revolutionary constitu-
tions of France, which used a right to equality before the law as 
the basis for abolition.207 Senator Sumner’s proposal was ulti-
mately withdrawn.208 In passing, however, Senator Sumner 
noted, “I venture to doubt the expediency of perpetuating in the 
Constitution language which, if it have any signification, seems 
to imply that ‘slavery or involuntary servitude’ may be provided 
‘for the punishment of crime.’”209 He explained his concerns lat-
 
 204. See, e.g., id. (“We lived under [the Constitution] happily, cheerfully, 
and prosperously up to the advent of this Administration. I believe a change of 
the Administration will again make us united, happy, and prosperous.”). 
 205. See, e.g., id. 1st Sess. app. at 111 (1864) (statement of Sen. Howe) (not-
ing that the passage of the Northwest Ordinance was one of the “grand oppor-
tunities” and “grand achievements” leading to the abolition of slavery).  
 206. See id. 1st Sess. 1482–83 (1864) (setting forth alternative language 
modeled on various French constitutions which he traced back to the concept 
of isonomia found in Herodotus). Sumner proposed that in place of the lan-
guage ultimately adopted, the Constitution should have been amended to 
read: 
All persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold 
another as a slave; and the Congress shall have power to make all 
laws necessary and proper to carry this declaration into effect every-
where within the United States and the jurisdiction thereof. 
Id. at 1483. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1489. Senator Howard responded to Sumner, saying: 
  The learned Senator from Massachusetts, I apprehend, has made 
a very radical mistake in regard to the application of this language of 
the French constitution. The purpose for which this language was 
used in the original constitution of the French republic of 1791, was to 
abolish nobility and privileged classes. . . . It was never intended 
there as a means of abolishing slavery at all. The Convention of 1794 
abolished slavery by another and separate decree expressly putting 
an end to slavery within the dominions of the French republic and all 
its colonies. 
  Now, sir, I wish as much as the Senator from Massachusetts in 
making this amendment to use significant language, language that 
cannot be mistaken or misunderstood; but I prefer to dismiss all ref-
erence to French constitutions or French codes, and go back to the 
good old Anglo-Saxon language employed by our fathers . . . . 
Id. at 1489 (statement of Sen. Howard). 
 209. Id. at 1482 (statement of Sen. Sumner). 
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er in the debate: 
I understand that it was the habit in certain parts of the country to 
convict persons or to doom them as slaves for life as a punishment for 
crime, and it was not proposed to prohibit this habit [by the North-
west Ordinance]. But slavery in our day is something distinct, perfect-
ly well known, requiring no words of distinction outside of itself. Why, 
therefore, add “nor involuntary servitude otherwise than in the pu-
nishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed?” To my mind they are entirely surplusage. They do no good 
there, but they absolutely introduce a doubt.210 
Yet Senator Sumner did not explain what doubt he thought 
the language introduced.211 He might have been referring to 
the struggles of the courts in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois212 to 
construe the term, but he makes no reference to them. Fur-
thermore, his understanding of “the habit in certain parts of 
the country” seems to have been mistaken. The reported cases 
from the Northwest Territory do not indicate that anyone was 
ever condemned to life-time slavery as punishment for a crime, 
although, as noted above, a similar concern with the wording of 
the Northwest Ordinance was raised at Iowa’s Constitutional 
Convention.213 Not surprisingly, Senator Sumner’s objections 
were treated as pedantic niggling by his fellow Senators and 
were ultimately ignored.214 
There are, however, some faint hints in the 1864 debates 
that the Thirteenth Amendment was meant to reach beyond 
the eradication of chattel slavery. In cataloging the evils that 
slavery had perpetrated upon the nation, Senator Wilson ar-
gued that the power of slavery had “bade the Legislature of 
New Mexico enact a slave code, and also a code for the en-
slavement of white laboring men.”215 The reference was to the 
system of debt bondage or peonage that existed in the south-
west under the Spanish and Mexicans and which was contin-
ued after the territory was incorporated into the United States 
under the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848.216 
 
 210. Id. at 1488. 
 211. Id. 
 212.  See Sarah v. Borders, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 341, 346 (1843); Choisser v. Har-
grave, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 317 (1836); In re Clark, 1 Blackf. 122 (Ind. 1821); Ander-
son v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 622, 690–91 (1856). 
 213.  See supra Part III.B; supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 214. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (statement of 
Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1489 (statement of Sen. Davis). 
 215. Id. at 1321. 
 216. See id.; see also Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement, 
U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (1848). 
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In his speech supporting the Amendment, Senator Harlan 
discussed the distinction between slavery and contract in ways 
suggesting that specific performance was not equated with “in-
voluntary servitude.” Following Locke, he argued that “the title 
of the individual to property originates in the labor and skill 
and toil which he uses in reducing it to possession and in en-
hancing its value after it may have been rightfully acquired.”217 
Once acquired, title could be transferred by contract. He went 
on: “That property may exist in the services of others will hard-
ly be seriously questioned. . . . I think all admit that title to the 
service of men may be acquired by contracts both express and 
implied.”218 
Such property in the services of another, however, could 
only arise through a contract supported by consideration in ex-
change for the services.219 Accordingly, Senator Harlan con-
cluded that if one traced the title to a slave back through all his 
or her previous owners one would not find a voluntary contract, 
but rather “you will be told that [the slaveholder] conquered 
[the slave] on the battle-field.”220 Senator Harlan reasoned, 
however, that these origins of the slave relationship might, at 
best, only justify ownership of the services of the captive but 
could not be extended to his children.221 Senator Harlan’s ar-
gument did not equate slavery with any and all labor under 
threat of legal sanctions in part because he acknowledged the 
legitimacy of property in the services of another.222 Rather, the 
evil of slavery lay in how the property was acquired—
involuntarily and without compensation—and how it was 
maintained—by the enslavement of the children of slaves. 
B. DEBATES OVER IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 
Debates over the two major laws implementing the Thir-
teenth Amendment reflect indicia of “involuntary servitude” 
similar to those relied on by the pre-Civil War courts con-
struing the Northwest Ordinance and its progeny. Given that 
both bills were passed shortly after the ratification of the Thir-
 
 217. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1437 (1864). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. (“It is held, I believe, by all jurists that a contract without con-
sideration is void; or at least it is voidable on proving the absence or failure of 
consideration.”). 
 220. Id. 
 221. See id. at 1437–38. 
 222.  See id. at 1437. 
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teenth Amendment and many of the same senators and repre-
sentatives participated in debate on the bills and the Amend-
ment, these records provide further evidence as to the original 
meaning of “involuntary servitude.” 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 declared that notwithstanding 
any state law to the contrary, freed slaves were to have the 
same rights “enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to 
like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other.”223 
The law went on to make it a federal crime for any person act-
ing under color of state law to deprive freed slaves of these 
rights.224 The Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 stated, “the holding of 
any person to service or labor under the system known as peo-
nage is hereby declared to be unlawful.”225 The debates over the 
Anti-Peonage Act in particular are instructive because peonage 
was a system that in some cases was at least nominally con-
tractual.226 Accordingly, the drafters of the Act had to wrestle 
with the question of how to distinguish between enforcing ordi-
nary contracts of labor and “involuntary servitude.” Given the 
widespread attempts by local governments and white employ-
ers to re-impose de facto slavery in the defeated Confederacy, 
the debates over the Civil Rights Act, which sought to respond 
to Southern mistreatment of newly freed slaves, also touched 
on the relationship between contract and “involuntary servi-
tude.”  
1. The Civil Rights Act 
The debates over the Civil Rights Act focused on the issue 
of contract enforcement in two ways. First, supporters of the 
Act were concerned about legislation by southern legislatures 
that deprived newly freed slaves of the ability to make certain 
kinds of contracts. One congressman, for example, insisted that 
federal legislation was needed to prevent states from trying to: 
Pass laws and enforce laws which reduce this class of people [i.e., 
freed slaves] to the condition of bondsmen; laws which prevent the en-
joyment of the fundamental rights of citizenship; laws which declare, 
for example, that they shall not have the privilege of purchasing a 
home for themselves and their families; laws which impair their abili-
 
 223. Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1, 14 Stat. 27–30 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). 
 224. Id. § 2. 
 225. Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 § 1, 14 Stat. 546 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1994 (2006)). 
 226.  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866) (statement of 
Rep. Thayer). 
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ty to make contracts for labor in such manner as virtually to deprive 
them of the power of making such contracts, and which then declare 
them vagrants because they have no homes and because they have no 
employment.227 
Elsewhere, the ability “[t]o make and enforce contracts” 
was listed among the civil rights that the bill was drafted to 
protect.228 
The second contractual issue that concerned the drafters 
was the rise of vagrancy statutes in the former Confederacy, an 
issue closely associated with concerns about contractual dis-
abilities.229 Essentially, these laws provided that African-
Americans without either employment or a fixed place of resi-
dence could be arrested for vagrancy.230 Violators were sen-
tenced to hard labor, and their labor would then be sold to 
whites. The drafters of the Civil Rights Act recognized that 
such laws could be used to re-impose de facto slavery, particu-
larly when they operated against a backdrop of other regula-
tions restricting the contractual rights of African-Americans.231 
The system of servitude-via-vagrancy was further rein-
forced by collusion between potential employers and state offi-
cials who openly condoned the pervasive—and often sadistic—
use of violence against freed slaves. One congressman reported: 
Planters combine together to compel them to work for such wages as 
their former masters may dictate, and deny them the privilege of hir-
ing to anyone without the consent of the master; and in order to make 
it impossible for them to seek employment elsewhere, the pass system 
is still enforced. If a freedman is found away from home he is taken 
up and whipped, and if he has the impudence to complain he is 
whipped again.232 
Elsewhere, Congress considered reports of an “old ne-
gro . . . kicked to death” whose body was then roasted on his 
own cabin fire.233 The same attackers “also burnt two others 
 
 227. Id. Elsewhere, Mr. Thayer asked rhetorically, “What kind of freedom 
is that under which a man may be deprived of the ability to make a contract 
. . . ?” Id. at 1152. 
 228. Id. at 1832 (statement of Rep. Lawrence). 
 229. Id. at 1151 (statement of Rep. Thayer). 
 230. Id.; see also Robin Yeamans, Constitutional Attacks on Vagrancy 
Laws, 20 STAN. L. REV. 782, 786 (1968) (citing several state statutes).  
 231. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1123 (1866) (statement of Rep. 
Cook). According to Representative Cook, under “the pretense of selling these 
men as vagrants,” these laws were often “calculated and intended to reduce 
them to slavery again . . . .” Id.  
 232. Id. at 1160 (statement of Rep. Windom). 
 233. Id. at 1835 (statement of Rep. Lawrence). 
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nearly to death, putting out the eye of one.”234 In short, the 
congressmen saw “involuntary servitude” as arising out of a 
combination of contractual disempowerment, state vagrancy 
laws, private collusion, and direct violence against freed slaves. 
2. The Anti-Peonage Act 
A year later, Congress passed the Anti-Peonage Act of 
1867. Originally developed in Latin America,235 peonage was 
described by the Supreme Court as “compulsory service,” which 
rendered the peon bound to their master’s service by indebted-
ness.236 The Court stated, “The peon can release himself there-
from, it is true, by the payment of the debt, but otherwise the 
service is enforced.”237 
New Mexican peonage, however, cannot be understood as 
simply a legal condition. Rather, legal rules operated against a 
background of quasi-legal and blatantly illegal practices. In 
New Mexico, peonage could involve “debts ingeniously con-
trived and cynically augmented to justify bondage; the de facto 
sale of peons, as if they were chattel slaves; harsh social control 
involving physical confinement in barracoons; long, debilitat-
ing, unhealthy work; repeated corporal punishment, often of an 
extreme, sadistic kind.”238 Likewise, as an outraged territorial 
supreme court made clear, in New Mexico peons could not 
count on local officials to protect them from overbearing mas-
ters.239  
Hence, peonage was an amalgamation of law and social 
practice. “[A peon] could not abandon the service; and if he did, 
his master pursued, reclaimed, and reduced him to obedience 
and labor again . . . .”240 Likewise, law and tradition authorized 
“masters . . . to punish servants who fail[ed] in the faithful ful-
 
 234. Id. 
 235. See generally Harry E. Cross, Debt Peonage Reconsidered: A Case 
Study in Nineteenth-Century Zacatecas, Mexico, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 473 (1979) 
(discussing the relatively mild forms of peonage found in the records of one ha-
cienda); Alan Knight, Mexican Peonage: What Was It and Why Was It? 18 J. 
LATIN AM. STUD. 41 (1986) (discussing the various forms of peonage found in 
different regions of Mexico). 
 236. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Knight, supra note 235, at 50. 
 239. See Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 193 (1857) (discussing “the un-
scrupulous disregard which too often prevails in justices’ courts in this country 
as to the legal rights of the unfortunate, the peon and the feeble, when con-
testing with the influential and more wealthy”). 
 240. Id. at 194. 
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fillment of their duties or disobey[ed] their superiors, by arrest 
or with shackles . . . .”241 An 1851 territorial act simply stated 
that “on the payment of the amount yet due [on a debt to his 
master] he [i.e., a peon] cannot be bound to continue service; 
but if he does not pay, he shall be bound.”242 As one historian 
explained, however, “the act had been so abused that slavery 
resulted. Generations of Mexican-American remained in bon-
dage to repay some forgotten ancestor’s debts; men, women, 
and children were sold like sheep or cattle.”243 
Disturbed by reports that the Army in New Mexico was re-
turning escaped peons to their former masters, Senator Sumn-
er began a push in the Senate for federal legislation.244 Fru-
strated junior officers in the Army in New Mexico reported that 
Army superiors had ordered them to return peons to masters 
because “[p]eonage is voluntary and not involuntary servi-
tude.”245 While some Democratic members of the Senate argued 
that to the extent peonage was voluntary, there was no need for 
Congress to intervene,246 proponents of the bill pointed out that 
many of the peons were Native Americans who had been kid-
napped by “the Mexicans.”247 Senator Wilson insisted that 
while  peonage was “in some cases . . . voluntary,” the practice 
was “in most cases forcible.”248 Furthermore, because peonage 
could continue so long as an outstanding debt existed, a “very 
small debt with the interest, where the peon has a family to 
support and the creditor supports him, amounts to a servitude 
 
 241. Id. at 198 (quoting Decree No. 67, an 1828 Texas statute). 
 242. Id. at 199 (reproducing language from an 1851 New Mexico act). New 
Mexico further amended its master and servant acts in 1852 to criminalize the 
breach of a labor contract, even when there was no underlying indebtedness. 
See id. at 204–05. The law also purported to give peons certain rights against 
their masters, although the New Mexico Territorial Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that peons could not rely on the local courts for justice. See id. at 205–06 
(“No authority is given the tribunal in this course to adjudicate the servant to 
the master upon giving the latter judgment for his debt.”); see also supra note 
239 and accompanying text. 
 243. Lawrence R. Murphy, Reconstruction in New Mexico, 43 N.M. HIST. 
REV. 99, 100 (1968). 
 244. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 240 (1867) (statement of Sen. 
Sumner) (pointing to the persistence of a system of slavery which even a pres-
idential proclamation has been “unable to root out”). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See id. at 1571 (statement of Sen. Davis) (“I think this feature of a 
man’s working to pay the debts that he owes to his creditors, in a modified 
form at least, ought to exist.”). 
 247. Id. (statement of Sen. Doolittle). 
 248. Id. (statement of Sen. Wilson). 
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for life.”249 In addition, the drafters were concerned that “the 
creditor . . . had a right by an involuntary process to the labor 
of the peon.”250 In other words, not only would peonage bind a 
person who promised to work off a debt to work until the debt 
was paid, but it would also force into involuntary work one who 
borrowed money but never made any promise to work in re-
payment. 
C. A RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS 
Several scholars have supported a broad reading of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which would ban the specific perfor-
mance of personal service contracts to protect laborers.251 This 
line of thinking is best represented by the scholarship of Lea 
VanderVelde, who argues that the Thirteenth Amendment 
must be construed in light of the free labor ideology of some of 
its Radical Republican supporters in the Reconstruction Con-
gresses.252 Rather than focusing on the Thirteenth Amendment 
as a vehicle for combating racial subordination, VanderVelde 
argues that it also served to constitutionally prohibit any sub-
jugation of employees to employers. This line of analysis does 
not begin with the text of the Amendment, but rather with the 
debates, which she rightly points out “focused primarily on the 
amendment’s objectives and expected effects.”253 VanderVelde 
concedes that “[d]espite the extensive debates over the values 
and objectives of the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment, the members 
 
 249. Id. (statement of Sen. Lane). Elsewhere, Senator Buckalew said: 
In practice, this is not a system of service for the payment of a debt, in 
view of which the servitude commences. As already explained, the 
almost invariable fact is that the peon continues accumulating debt, 
and as that debt is formed while he is subject to a master the terms of 
it are always exceedingly unfavorable to him, and for a very nominal 
consideration he is continued in the system of service during his 
whole lifetime. 
Id. at 1572. 
 250. Id. at 1571 (statement of Sen. Lane). 
 251. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Aboli-
tion to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1099 (1987) (supporting an 
“elastic” interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment in support of labor 
rights); Heidi Marie Werntz, Waiver of Beck Rights and Resignation Rights: 
Infusing the Union-Member Relationship with Individualized Commitment, 43 
CATH. U. L. REV. 159, 217–20 (1993) (noting courts’ interpretation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment to outlaw personal-service contracts). 
 252. See generally VanderVelde, supra note 8, at 856–57 (arguing that the 
framers intended the Thirteenth Amendment to maintain a system of “com-
pletely free and voluntary labor”); VanderVelde, supra note 9, at 437–38 (ar-
guing that the drafters’ notion of free labor extended beyond slavery). 
 253. See VanderVelde, supra note 9, at 451. 
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of the Reconstruction Congress directed very little attention to 
its actual text.”254 Indeed, she sees something of a disjunction 
between the text of the Amendment and the line of thinking 
that she identifies as the labor vision of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, writing, “[t]he members of Congress rarely consi-
dered whether the actual language of the amendment conveyed 
the breadth of meanings its advocates ascribed to it.”255 Her ex-
tensive analysis of the congressional debates, however, uncov-
ers a coherent line of thinking that linked the suppression of 
slavery to the suppression of abusive labor practices. She 
writes: 
These dual strands grew out of the Republican Party’s origins in the 
Free Soil, Free Labor Movement as well as the self-interest of the 
northern white working class. As the condemnation of slavery pro-
vided the negative side of the labor vision, the free labor ideal pro-
vided its affirmative side. The two together present a powerful argu-
ment for constitutionally grounding the protection of working people 
from overreaching subjugation and abuses at the hands of employ-
ers.256 
VanderVelde however, does “not make express claims 
about the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment’s precise meaning,”257 
which would require an explicit constitutional theory.258 Histor-
ically, she identifies three ways in which the framers of the 
Thirteenth Amendment articulated their understanding of how 
the Amendment would reach beyond the suppression of chattel 
slavery.  
First, she notes that all parties were eager to insist that 
certain kinds of relationships be excluded from the reach of the 
Amendment. In particular, several Senators and Representa-
tives expressed concern that the Amendment would undermine 
the control of a patriarch over his family.259 VanderVelde con-
cludes that “[n]o congressmen claimed the term [‘involuntary 
 
 254. Id. at 448. 
 255. Id. at 448–49. 
 256. Id. at 495. 
 257. Id. at 440 n.20. 
 258. Id. (“Such claims would require an analysis of the various schools of 
intentionalism. I am content to take the first step in identifying and tracing 
the nature and influence of the free labor theme.”). As explained in Part II, the 
argument offered in this Article is originalist, but it does not rest on the “orig-
inal intentions” of the constitutional framers. Rather, it focuses on the original 
public meaning of the constitutional text. 
 259. See id. at 454–57 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 
(1864) (statement of Rep. Wood) (“The Constitution describes slaves, and I 
suppose children and apprentices might come under the same class as persons 
bound to service.”)). 
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servitude’] should apply to wives or children, relationships 
within the family which could be considered unequal and po-
tentially abusive” but that there was widespread agreement 
that it reached beyond the mere abolition of chattel slavery in 
the South.260 She also notes that apprenticeship agreements, by 
which a minor was bound in service to a craftsman by his or 
her parent, were also not regarded as an object of the Amend-
ment because “in essence, the apprenticeship relations was 
more an extension of the father’s dominion of the family than 
the master’s control of the workplace.”261 As we have seen, 
these conclusions are consistent with the understanding of “in-
voluntary servitude” and its relationship to apprenticeship evi-
dent in pre-Thirteenth Amendment debates in state constitu-
tional conventions. 
Second, she analyzes the rhetoric of the Radical Republi-
cans, describing “a vision of employment relations in terms of 
substantial equality between employees and their employers 
and sufficient labor autonomy to permit individual autono-
my.”262 Much of the pre-Civil War rhetoric revolved around the 
status of labor. Southern apologists for slavery were eager to 
compare northern laborers to slaves, while northern anti-
slavery activists sought to mobilize opposition to slavery by ar-
guing that it degraded white laborers. For example, Senator 
Henry Wilson of Massachusetts argued during the 1860 elec-
tion that slavery “degraded labor and the meaning of labor for 
poor white working men in the South.”263 Likewise, during the 
congressional debates over the Thirteenth Amendment, Wilson 
 
 260. See id. at 457 (arguing that the term “involuntary servitude” was “not 
limited . . . to Black slavery and its vestiges”). 
 261. Id. at 458. Given her historical approach, VanderVelde concludes 
somewhat oddly: 
Despite the framers’ indication that “involuntary servitude” should 
not apply to apprentices, these arrangements eventually came within 
the term’s ambit. As patriarchal domination of the family eroded, ap-
prenticeship came to be seen more as a labor relationship. Since the 
scope of the term “involuntary servitude” was broader than slavery 
and narrower than family relations, apprenticeships ultimately fell 
within the proscription of the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment. 
Id. In support of this claim, however, she cites not any contemporary source 
from the debates over the Thirteenth Amendment, but rather the 1911 deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), an opi-
nion dealing with promissory fraud statutes rather than apprenticeships (Bai-
ley was himself an adult). See id. 
 262. Id. at 452. 
 263. Id. at 466 (quoting Sen. Henry Wilson, How Ought Workingmen to 
Vote in the Coming Election? (Oct. 15, 1860)). 
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and other Radical Republicans insisted, “[t]he same influences 
that go to keep down and crush down the rights of the poor 
black man bear down and oppress the poor white laboring 
man.”264 
This rhetoric, in turn, drew on debates over the status of 
labor and capital. In particular, VanderVelde links debates 
over the suppression of chattel slavery in the South to the 
“wage slavery” debates over the rights of the working man to 
the “fruits of his labor.”265 At the heart of this vision was the 
assumption that freedom required more than simply the ab-
sence of chattel slavery and mere wage labor. Rather, to be a 
“freeman” meant that one enjoyed economic independence, so-
cial equality with one’s employer, and a set of legal rights in-
suring the reality rather than a simulacrum of freedom.266 
Third, VanderVelde looks to the specific arrangements in 
the post-war South that the Radical Republicans thought could 
be addressed by the Thirteenth Amendment or implementing 
legislation passed pursuant to the authority that it granted.267 
She provides a litany of the labor practices objected to by sup-
porters of the Thirteenth Amendment. In addition to condemn-
ing the practice of physically apprehending freedmen who fled 
from their employers, congressmen also criticized less blatant 
forms of coercion.268 In the southern states a variety of rules 
were put in place designed to suppress competition among em-
ployers, thus effectively depriving potential employees of mea-
 
 264. Id. at 440 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866) 
(statement of Sen. Wilson)). 
 265. See id. at 472–77 (discussing the use of rhetoric tying “degraded labor” 
and “wage slavery” to chattel slavery in congressional debates). 
 266. See id. at 476 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1865) 
(statement of Sen. Wilson)). Senator Wilson, for example, said in the debates 
after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment: 
[W]e must see to it that the man made free by the Constitution . . . is 
a freeman indeed; that he can go where he pleases; work when and 
for whom he pleases; that he can sue and be sued; that he can lease 
and buy and sell and own property, real and personal; that he can go 
into the schools and educate himself and his children; that the rights 
and guarantees of the good old common law are his, and that he 
walks the earth, proud and erect in the conscious dignity of a free 
man. 
Id. 
 267. See id. at 485–86 (discussing the congressional denouncement of em-
ployer overreaching and abuse). 
 268. See id. at 487 (noting congressional disapproval of employers’ efforts 
to limit workers’ postemployment opportunities, fix wage rates, and restrict 
employees’ private conduct). 
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ningful choice or job mobility. These included compacts be-
tween former slave owners fixing wages and working conditions 
and prohibitions on the hiring of a freedman without the con-
sent of his former master.269  
In addition, states passed laws that allowed employers to 
bring “enticement” actions against competitors who lured away 
labor with higher wages.270 Other laws allowed employers to 
cheat employees out of their wages by withholding earnings 
from any worker who quit before the end of a contract term, or 
alternatively provided pretexts for not paying those workers 
who did complete their contracts.271 Finally, congressmen con-
demned imprisonment for debt and the system of peonage in 
New Mexico under which a debtor could be forced to work for 
his creditor in liquidation of the debt.272 From this evidence, 
VanderVelde concludes: 
From the texts of the debates, there is little doubt that Congress in-
tended to accord workers the right to quit, but the parameters of this 
right were more complex. In addition to widespread agreement to 
prohibit specific performance of labor contracts, speakers repeatedly 
raised the specter of laborers forcibly being dragged back to either 
their former masters or their new employers and subjected to the 
boss’s will.273 
In short, VanderVelde’s research presents a powerful case 
for an understanding of the term “involuntary servitude” reach-
ing specific performance of all personal service contracts.  
This objection can be met with two lines of argument. The 
first response relies on an essentially philosophical claim about 
the relationship between the drafters’ intentions and the mean-
ing of the constitutional text. The second response is essentially 
historical, and seeks to show that the statements of intention 
 
 269. Id. at 488–91. 
 270. Id. at 490 (citing D. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK 
FORCED LABOR AFTER SLAVERY, 3, 5–7, 39–40 (1978)). 
 271. See id. at 492–93 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 
(1866) (statement of Sen. Wilson)). Senator Wilson said: 
The Legislature of Louisiana has passed an act by which . . . any 
freedman who makes a contract under it is perfectly at the control 
and will of the man with whom he makes the contract. If that man is 
a bad man, at the end of the year the freedman will not receive a 
farthing for his year’s labor. He can trump up charges to cheat and 
defraud the laborer. So odious are these laws that the Freedmen’s 
Bureau has set them aside . . . because they in reality reduce the 
freedman to the condition of a serf, or at any rate of a peon. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1866). 
 272. See VanderVelde, supra note 9, at 490 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1571–72 (1867) (statement of Sen. Doolittle)). 
 273. Id. at 489. 
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on which VanderVelde’s argument relies are essentially consis-
tent with the meaning of “involuntary servitude” that existed 
prior to the drafting of the Thirteenth Amendment. Of these 
two lines of argument, the first claim is more important than 
the second. This is because the philosophical argument points 
towards the important way in which the historical arguments 
that I have offered serve a limited purpose. Specifically, I am 
not purporting to offer an account of the hopes, motivations, or 
aspirations of those who drafted the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Rather, this Article represents an effort to determine the public 
meaning of the term “involuntary servitude” when it was incor-
porated into the U.S. Constitution. There is obviously some 
overlap between this project and the historical project of under-
standing the politics of Reconstruction, but they are neverthe-
less different and distinct endeavors. 
The relationship between the intentions of the Radical Re-
publican supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment and the 
meaning of the term “involuntary servitude” is complex. There 
are two problems with simply equating their intentions with 
the meaning of the term. First, as a semantic matter, to reduce 
the meaning of a legal text to its expected application would 
lead to paradoxical results. Lawrence Solum gives the following 
example: 
Suppose we limited the application of the Constitution of 1789 to 
those applications that were expected by the framers. Expectations 
are occurrent or dispositional mental states—individuals either have 
an expectation or they don’t. Let’s assume that framers were of one 
mind (they all shared the same expectations) and that their expecta-
tions were abundant: they thought about lots of possible applications. 
But even assuming that the framers [sic] minds were racing at a mile 
per minute, their expectations would quickly run out. That is, if the 
meaning of a constitutional provision were identical to the original 
expectations, there would simply be “no meaning” in most cases. For 
example, it might well be the case that no framer would have thought 
of the possibility of a tie between the President and Vice President in 
the Electoral College [a possibility under the original constitution of 
1789]. If the meaning of the relevant provision were identical with the 
expectations, then there is simply no constitutional provision at all to 
deal with this situation.274 
The very fact that a constitution by definition must apply 
to unforeseen circumstances implies that its meaning cannot be 
reduced to its drafters’ expectations about its application with-
out risking an absence of meaningful content. The other prob-
lem with equating the meaning of “involuntary servitude” with 
 
 274. Solum, supra note 72, at 109–10. 
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the intentions of the Radical Republicans was that they were 
by no means the only constitutionally relevant actors in its 
enactment. For example, the Thirteenth Amendment passed 
Congress on January 31, 1865 and was signed by the President 
on February 1, 1865, but it did not take effect until December 
6, 1865, when it was ratified by Georgia. In the end, twenty-
seven states ratified the amendment, including all the former 
Confederate states except Florida, Texas, and Mississippi. 
Hence, in addition to abolitionist Senators, the adopters of the 
Thirteenth Amendment included ex-Confederate slaveholders 
whose goal was not social transformation but rather re-
integration into the Union and the withdrawal of federal troops 
with as little disruption to existing hierarchies as possible. This 
does not mean that the Thirteenth Amendment must be con-
strued with reference to the wishes of slaveholders, but it does 
illustrate the complexity involved in identifying the relevant 
group of intentions if intentions are to be made the touchstone 
of meaning. Nevertheless, the intentions of the Radical Repub-
licans documented by VanderVelde275 are important because 
they provide linguistic evidence as to the term’s publicly avail-
able meaning at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment’s adop-
tion. This leads to the second, historical, response to Vander-
Velde’s claims. 
As a historical matter, the very complexity that Vander-
Velde flags276 undermines her claim that specific performance 
was universally regarded as unconstitutional. First, nowhere 
did the congressmen and senators ever directly consider the 
question of equitable enforcement of an otherwise legally enfor-
ceable, affirmative promise to work. Given that no common law 
jurisdiction had such a remedy, it is unsurprising that the issue 
did not surface. Extending language discussing the brutal con-
ditions of New Mexican peonage or the Reconstruction South to 
all personal service contracts, however, is unwarranted. These 
relationships involved coercion, exploitation, duration, and vi-
olence that made them far more similar to the de facto slavery 
via indenture, condemned by antebellum courts as “involuntary 
servitude,” than to specific enforcement of a voluntary, well-
compensated, limited, non-violent contract for personal servic-
es. Senator Cowan, who VanderVelde cites in support of her 
claim, argued that short of slavery an equitable order of specific 
performance of a labor contract was “the only way I know by 
 
 275.  See VanderVelde, supra note 9, at 445. 
 276.  See id. at 488–90. 
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which the laborer can be put at the mercy of the hirer in a con-
tract for labor; it is the only possible and conceivable way apart 
from slavery.”277 Senator Cowan, however, was a staunch op-
ponent of Reconstruction and by insisting that the Thirteenth 
Amendment prohibited only orders of specific performance—
and outright slavery—he was seeking to confine its meaning to 
pre-Amendment decisions of the equity courts.278 In other 
words, the specific performance claim was made to assert erro-
neously that the term “involuntary servitude” did nothing but 
codify the existing common law. Not surprisingly, supporters of 
the Amendment did not adopt Senator Cowan’s position. Ra-
ther, they made the actual condition of the workers, rather 
than a specific remedy, the touchstone, highlighting, for exam-
ple, state laws under which  “any freeman who [made] a con-
tract . . . is perfectly at the control and will of the man with 
whom he makes the contract.”279 Under this formulation, the 
forced performance of contracts that would result in domination 
akin to slavery could be “involuntary servitude,” but such an 
understanding would not make specific performance of all per-
sonal service contracts per se unconstitutional. 
The legislative history surrounding the Thirteenth 
Amendment shows that it was originally understood to extend 
beyond chattel slavery to include extremely oppressive but no-
minally contractual relationships. This concern with extremely 
oppressive relationships, however, need not be understood as 
co-extensive with the equitable rule against specific perfor-
mance of personal service contracts. Rather, such an interpre-
tation is both under- and over-inclusive, exempting many op-
pressive relationships from the Amendment’s reach, while 
covering the enforcement of many contracts that would not re-
sult in the kind of slave-like conditions encompassed by the 
original understanding of the term. 
V.  “INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE” IN THE COURTS   
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to provide a clear doctrin-
al framework for analyzing claims under the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Rather, judicial treatment of the Amendment has 
been ad hoc, involving sweeping and contradictory dicta with-
 
 277. Id. at 489 n.224. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1866) 
(statement of Sen. Cowan)).   
 278.  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 341–43 (1866) (statement of 
Sen. Cowan). 
 279. Id. at 340 (statement of Sen. Wilson). 
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out clear doctrinal elaboration.280 Nevertheless, when read 
against the original understanding of “involuntary servitude,” 
the cases largely fit within the contours of the concept fleshed 
out by the states carved from the Northwest Territory before 
the Civil War. 
A. EARLY CASES CONSTRUING THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The Thirteenth Amendment was adopted in 1865. Al-
though some lawyers feared it would invalidate a host of con-
tracts,281 the notion that specific performance of a personal ser-
vice contract is a form of “involuntary servitude” did not find its 
way immediately into the mainstream legal consciousness. For 
example, John Norton Pomeroy’s 1879 Treatise on the Specific 
Performance of Contracts makes no mention of an argument 
based on the prohibition of “involuntary servitude,” focusing 
entirely on the practical inability of courts to enforce such obli-
gations.282 One possible counterexample is the case of Ford v. 
Jermon283 decided in the District Court of Philadelphia in 1865. 
Originally, the plaintiff, a theater owner, sought an order of 
specific performance against an actress who had contracted to 
perform at his theater.284 He subsequently amended his com-
plaint to seek only a negative injunction,285 based on the recent-
 
 280. See, e.g., William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1311, 1313–17 (2007) (noting the lack of consistent jurisprudence inter-
preting the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 281. See HAROLD M. HYMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. 
CHASE 130 (1997) (“Warnings proliferated that any party to any civil contract 
who regretted entering into it might allege Thirteenth Amendment grounds in 
order to win release.”). 
 282. See JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFOR-
MANCE OF CONTRACTS § 22 (1879) (“As a general proposition, contracts which 
provide for the personal services of the parties, are not specifically enforced in 
equity, not because the legal remedy of damages is always sufficiently certain 
and adequate, but because the courts do not possess the means and ability of 
enforcing their decrees, which would necessarily be very special, and of com-
pelling the performance which constitutes the equitable remedy.”). Forty-
seven years later, the third edition of Pomeroy’s treatise likewise contained no 
clear reference to the Thirteenth Amendment argument. See JOHN NORTON 
POMEROY & JOHN C. MANN, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF 
CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1926). But see id. § 310 n.(a) (“Any system or plan by which 
the court could order or direct the physical coercion of the laborer would be 
wholly out of harmony with the spirit of our institutions . . . .” (quoting H.W. 
Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 109 N.W. 483 (Iowa 1906))). 
 283. 6 Phila. 6 (Dist. Ct. 1865). 
 284. Id. at 6. 
 285. Id.  
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ly decided English case of Lumley v. Wagner.286 After rehears-
ing various practical difficulties involved in granting such a 
remedy, the court in Ford stated that such an order would be “a 
mitigated form of slavery” and would not be given.287 Despite 
this ringing statement, there are good reasons for not reading 
Ford v. Jermon as a contemporary gloss on the Thirteenth 
Amendment. The opinion never cites or references the Amend-
ment.288 Rather, the reference to slavery seems to be a rhetori-
cal flourish added to what seems like a relatively straightfor-
ward common-law analysis. Although later commentators 
unsuccessfully advocated rejecting the Lumley rule on constitu-
tional grounds, this does not seem to be what the court is doing 
in Ford.289 
The earliest explicit judicial construction of the effect of the 
Thirteenth Amendment on the enforcement of a contract of 
personal service came in the 1867 circuit case of In re Turn-
er.290 The case arose out of an indenture agreement between a 
young girl, Elizabeth Turner, her mother, and their former 
master, Philemon T. Hambleton, who may also have been 
Turner’s father.291 In 1864, Maryland had adopted a new con-
stitution that outlawed slavery.292 As the court explained: 
Almost immediately thereafter many of the freed people of Talbot 
county [on Maryland’s eastern shore] were collected together under 
some local authority, the nature of which does not clearly appear, and 
the younger persons were bound as apprentices, usually, if not al-
ways, to their late masters.293 
According to her indenture, Turner agreed to work for 
Hambleton for ten years.294 Under the state’s newly adopted 
“black code,” Hambleton had no duty to provide her with the 
education in reading, writing, and arithmetic to which white 
 
 286. (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch.). 
 287. Ford, 6 Phila. at 7. 
 288.  See id. at 6–8. 
 289. Compare Robert S. Stevens, Involuntary Servitude by Injunction, 6 
CORNELL L.Q. 235, 235 (1921) (arguing that the rule in Lumley v. Wagner con-
stitutes involuntary servitude), with RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS: SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE § 380(2) (1932) (endorsing negative injunctions of personal-
service contracts), and id. § 380 illus. 6 (describing a situation based on Lum-
ley v. Wagner). 
 290. 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). 
 291. See HYMAN, supra note 281, at 125 (noting the possible paternity). 
 292. See id. at 124. 
 293. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339. 
 294. See id. at 338. 
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apprentices had a right under Maryland law.295 Also, in con-
trast to white indenture agreements, the black code declared 
the master’s authority over an African-American apprentice a 
“property and interest” that in contrast to rights over a white 
servant could be transferred without the servant’s consent.296 
In return for her decade of service, Turner’s mother was to re-
ceive $22.50, and Turner herself would get $15.00 at the end of 
the contract.297 
Turner sued for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, 
claiming that her detention under the contract constituted “in-
voluntary servitude.”298 In an extremely terse decision, Chief 
Justice Chase, sitting as a circuit justice, held that the inden-
ture agreement constituted “involuntary servitude” under the 
Amendment and that Maryland’s differing rules for African-
American and white apprentices violated the newly passed Civ-
il Rights Act.299 The court ordered Turner released,300 and 
Hambleton did not appeal.301 The opinion contains no argu-
ments for its conclusions.302 The factual recitation, however, fo-
cuses on all of the elements considered by antebellum courts in 
the Northwest, a body of law with which Chief Justice Chase, a 
long-time anti-slavery lawyer from Ohio, was no doubt famili-
ar.303 The contract was probably involuntary ab initio. Turner 
agreed to it while she was still functionally a slave.304 The 
Maryland constitution emancipating slaves went into effect 
three days prior to the indenture agreement.305 In addition, 
Turner was a minor at the time306 and seems to have been 
coerced by local officials.307 The contract extended over a long 
 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 339. 
 297. Id. at 338. 
 298. Id. at 339. 
 299. Id. at 339–40. 
 300. Id. at 40. 
 301. See HYMAN, supra note 281, at 128. 
 302. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339 (“For the present, I shall restrict myself 
to a brief statement of these conclusions, without going into the grounds of 
them.”). 
 303. Id. at 339–40; see HYMAN, supra note 281, at 33. 
 304. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 338. 
 305. See id. at 338 (noting that the new constitution went into effect on 
November 1, 1864 and the indenture was executed on November 3, 1864). 
 306. See id. (finding that Turner was born in 1856, making her barely 
twelve years old when the indenture was executed).  
 307. See id. at 339 (noting that local officials rounded up newly freed slaves 
immediately after the new constitution went into effect and had the younger 
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period, lasting ten years.308 The compensation to be provided 
was nominal at best.309 Finally, while the record does not con-
tain any explicit mention of direct physical coercion by Hamble-
ton, Turner’s action was styled as a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus directed at Hambleton,310 which implied his ability to 
control Turner’s movements, and in his reply he all but admit-
ted direct coercion of her person, stating “I herewith produce 
the body of Elizabeth Turner showing the cause of her capture 
and detention.”311 
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the meaning of 
the Thirteenth Amendment five years later in the Slaughter-
house Cases, which considered a challenge to a Louisiana law 
granting a twenty-five year monopoly on slaughterhouses in 
New Orleans.312 In attacking the law, counsel for the petition-
ers argued that the “prohibition of ‘slavery and involuntary 
servitude’ . . . compromises much more than the abolition or 
prohibition of African slavery,” likening the state-granted mo-
nopoly to the feudal obligations of serfs.313 Writing for the 
Court, Justice Miller was not persuaded. Acknowledging that 
the “word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery,”314 he in-
sisted that to “endeavor to find in it a reference to servitudes, 
which may have been attached to property . . . requires an ef-
fort, to say the least.”315 
The majority opinion, however, did provide some guidance 
as to what sorts of relationships short of chattel slavery might 
constitute “involuntary servitude.” 
It was very well understood that, in long-term apprenticeships—as 
had been practiced in the West India Islands after the abolition of 
slavery by the English government—or in the slaves’ reduction to the 
condition of serfs attached to the plantation, the purpose of the article 
might have been evaded, if only the word slavery had been used.316 
 
people execute indentures). 
 308. See id. at 338 (finding that the contract was to last until October 18, 
1874). 
 309. See id. (noting that Turner was to receive fifteen dollars in return for 
ten years of service). 
 310.  Id. at 337. 
 311. Id. at 338 (emphasis added). 
 312. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
 313. Id. at 49–50. 
 314. Id. at 69. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
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The Court’s next major pronouncement on the meaning of 
the Thirteenth Amendment came in the Civil Rights Cases.317 
In 1875, Congress forbade racial discrimination in public ac-
commodations.318 Several persons indicted under the law 
claimed that Congress had exceeded its authority under the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in passing the sta-
tute.319 Writing for the Court, Justice Bradley struck the law 
down.320 Even while acknowledging that the Thirteenth 
Amendment is “an absolute declaration that slavery or involun-
tary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United 
States,”321 he insisted that private discrimination was beyond 
Congress’s enforcement power.322 In a vigorous dissent, Justice 
Harlan insisted that the Court’s approach rested “upon grounds 
entirely too narrow and artificial.”323 
Shortly after the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan de-
cided Arthur v. Oakes324 while sitting as a circuit judge. The de-
cision has been widely cited for the proposition that specific 
performance of a personal service contract would violate the 
Thirteenth Amendment.325 The case involved a dispute between 
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and the Brotherhood 
of Locomotive Engineers and other unions.326 The lower court 
issued an injunction directed at the railroad’s employees, en-
joining them “[f]rom . . . quitting the service of the said [rail-
road], with or without notice.”327 On appeal, the workers chal-
lenged this portion of the injunction.328 Justice Harlan chose to 
construe the issue presented very broadly, writing that “the vi-
 
 317. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 318. Id. at 4. 
 319. See id. at 8–9. 
 320. Id. at 25. 
 321. Id. at 20. 
 322. Id. at 24–25 (“It would be running the slavery argument into the 
ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see 
fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take 
into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in 
other matters of intercourse or business.”). 
 323. Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 324. 63 F. 310 (7th Cir. 1894) (Harlan, J.). 
 325. See 5A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1204, at 
401 (1964); see also Kemp v. Div. No. 241, Amalgamated Ass’n of St. & Elec. 
Ry. Employees of Am., 99 N.E. 389, 404 (Ill. 1912); Henderson v. Cambria 
Smokeless Coal Co., 21 Pa. D. & C. 654, 658 (Com. Pl. 1934). 
 326. Arthur, 63 F. at 314. 
 327. Id. at 313. 
 328. Id. at 316. 
 2078 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:2020 
 
tal question [is] whether a court of equity will, under any cir-
cumstances, by injunction, prevent one individual from quitting 
the personal service of another.”329 The railroad workers in the 
case, however, were apparently at-will employees,330 so strictly 
speaking the case did not present the issue of whether an em-
ployer could specifically enforce a contract affirmatively prom-
ising to perform a particular service for a particular time. Ra-
ther, the real question in Arthur was the narrower issue of 
whether a court could keep an at-will employee from exercising 
his contractual right to quit his employment at any time. The 
injunction in the case would have effectively gone beyond the 
scope of the contract between the railroad and the laborers by 
requiring them to continue working when they had no contrac-
tual obligation to do so. 
Nevertheless, Justice Harlan decided the case in sweeping 
terms. He insisted that, “[i]t would be an invasion of one’s nat-
ural liberty to compel him to work for or to remain in the per-
sonal service of another.”331 He likened this type of constraint 
to a condition of “involuntary servitude,” which, under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, shall not exist in the United States.332 
Having grounded his decision in the Constitution, however, 
Justice Harlan went on to argue that his conclusion was also 
dictated by ordinary rules of equity jurisprudence. “The rule, 
we think, is without exception that equity will not compel the 
actual, affirmative performance by an employé [sic] of merely 
personal services . . . .”333 
The Supreme Court first directly passed on the meaning of 
“involuntary servitude” in the 1897 case of Robertson v. Bald-
win.334 Robertson, a seaman on the barkantine Arago, was 
jailed and returned to his ship under a federal statute after he 
attempted to breach his contract to crew her on a voyage to 
South America.335 He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, 
challenging the statute on the ground that it imposed “involun-
tary servitude.”336 The Court rejected his argument, ruling that 
 
 329. Id. 
 330. See id. at 317. 
 331. Id. at 317–18. 
 332. Id. at 318. 
 333. Id. 
 334. 165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
 335. See id. at 275–76. 
 336. Id. at 275. 
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requiring seamen upon pain of imprisonment to perform their 
contracts did not run afoul of the Amendment.337 
The Justices relied in part on tradition. Seamen had histor-
ically been subject to forced performance of their contracts, a 
rule the opinion traced in excruciating detail from “the mari-
time law of the ancient Rhodians” to the nineteenth century.338 
The opinion also insisted that the forced performance of the 
contract could not be “involuntary servitude” because it was en-
tered into voluntarily.339 The Court noted that “if one should 
agree, for a yearly wage, to serve another in a particular capac-
ity during his life . . . the contract might not be enforceable for 
the want of a legal remedy, or might be void upon grounds of 
public policy, but the servitude could not be properly termed 
‘involuntary’”340 Pointedly, the Court noted that under the Eng-
lish master and servant acts, a laborer could be criminally pu-
nished for breach of contract.341 Such contracts, said the Court, 
were among those that were not involuntary.342 Such criminal 
punishment did not exist in the United States, said the Court, 
simply because “public opinion” would not “tolerate a statute to 
that effect.”343 
B. THE PEONAGE CASES 
The Court’s most extensive foray into the meaning of “invo-
luntary servitude” came in the so-called Peonage Cases. In a se-
ries of opinions in the early twentieth-century, the Court de-
clared in sweeping dicta that any attempt to enforce a contract 
with legal sanctions would constitute “involuntary servi-
tude.”344 Not surprisingly, these cases have been cited in sup-
 
 337. Id. at 281. 
 338. Id. at 282–87. In addition, the Court noted approvingly that “seamen 
are treated by Congress . . . as deficient in that full and intelligent responsibil-
ity for their acts which is accredited to ordinary adults.” Id. at 287. The 
Court’s reliance on history has drawn the ire of some modern commentators. 
See Lauren Kares, Note, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional Amend-
ment in Search of a Doctrine, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 372, 392, 394 (1995) (criti-
cizing the rationale in Robertson). 
 339. See Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281. 
 340. Id. 
 341. See id. at 285–86. 
 342. See id. at 283. 
 343. Id. at 281. 
 344. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944) (concluding that 
“no state can make the quitting of work any component of a crime”); Bailey v. 
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 243 (1911) (“The act of Congress [under the Thir-
teenth Amendment] . . . necessarily embraces all legislation which seeks to 
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port of the claim that specific performance of a personal service 
contract would be unconstitutional.345 None of the Peonage 
Cases, however, involved equitable remedies for breach of con-
tract.346 More importantly, they all dealt with labor relations in 
the South at the height of Jim Crow, and when the decisions 
are read against their historical background, they cannot be 
understood as standing for the sweeping proposition that any 
legally required labor is unconstitutional, a fact recognized by 
dissenting justices at the time and courts and commentators 
since.347 Rather, the practices banned in these cases bear all of 
the hallmarks of extreme domination that characterized the 
original understanding of “involuntary servitude” discussed 
above. 
In the decades after Reconstruction, debt bondage emerged 
as part of the effort to reassert white dominion over African-
American workers.348 This was done in a variety of ways. Geor-
gia and Alabama adopted legislation creating an irrebuttable 
presumption of fraud when a worker indebted to his employer 
quit, allowing employers to threaten workers with fines and in-
carceration if they walked off the job.349 Other jurisdictions 
auctioned off the labor of those jailed for certain offenses with 
so-called “criminal-surety” laws.”350 A potential employer would 
post a bond to free the prisoner in return for a promise to work 
off the debt.351 In theory, those posting bond could bid against 
 
compel the service or labor by making it a crime to refuse . . . to perform it.”). 
 345. See, e.g., Ex parte Lloyd, 13 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (E.D. Ky. 1936) (hold-
ing that an inmate in a state drug treatment facility can breach an entrance 
contract to work for the facility, and the state was not entitled to specific per-
formance of the contract); Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 9 A.2d 639, 642 (Md. 1939) 
(using the Peonage Cases to argue that executory contracts cannot be specifi-
cally enforced until performance is completed); State ex rel. Norton v. Janing, 
156 N.W.2d 9, 10 (Neb. 1968) (citing the Peonage Cases to invalidate a state 
statute criminalizing the failure to pay a contractual obligation); Am. League 
Baseball Club v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 465 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914) (holding that 
the Thirteenth Amendment barred specific enforcement of an employment 
contract). 
 346. See infra text accompanying note 389. 
 347. See infra text accompanying notes 389–413. 
 348. See generally PETE DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN 
THE SOUTH, 1901–1969 (1972); N. Gordon Carper, Slavery Revisited: Peonage 
in the South, 37 PHYLON 85 (1976); William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servi-
tude in the South, 1865–1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J. S. HIST. 31 (1976). 
 349. See Act of Mar. 9, 1911, No. 98, 1911 Ala. Laws 93; Procuring Money 
on Contract for Service, No. 345, 1903 Ga. Laws 90; see also Cohen, supra note 
348, at 53. 
 350. See Cohen, supra note 348, at 53. 
 351. Id.  
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one another with shorter work periods. In practice, those jailed 
found themselves bound upon pain of re-imprisonment to work 
off a debt incurred as a result of an “agreement” made on pain 
of continued imprisonment.352 Florida went beyond mere crimi-
nal sanctions for walking off the job and passed a law that 
made “willful disobedience of orders” and “wanton impudence” 
criminal offenses that could result in fines and incarceration.353 
While some of these statutes—such as Florida’s sanctions 
for impudence—went beyond the mere punishing of breach of 
contract, all of them operated within a thick web of other laws 
that had the effect of suppressing competition between employ-
ers, further restricting the choices available to African-
American workers. First, states passed anti-enticement laws 
that created penalties for those who tried to lure away em-
ployees with offers of better wages or working conditions.354 
Second, emigrant agents, who recruited African-American 
workers in areas of low employment and transported them to 
jobs in distant, labor-starved markets, were subject to onerous 
licensing and taxation requirements.355 Georgia, for example, 
levied a tax of $500 on emigrant agents for each county in 
which they operated.356 Mississippi made it a crime to “en-
tice . . . [any] negro” to leave the state.357 Third, restrictive 
 
 352. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 13 Ala. App. 431 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915); Lee v. 
State, 75 Ala. 29, 30–31 (1883); Wilson v. State, 138 Ga. 489, 494 (1912); see 
also Cohen, supra note 348, at 54–55. 
 353. See An Act in Relation to Contracts of Persons of Color, ch. 1470, 1865 
Fla. Laws 32, amended by Act of Dec. 13, 1866, ch. 1551, 1866 Fla. Laws 21–
22; see also Cohen, supra note 348, at 42. 
 354. See Act of Feb. 16, 1866, No. 100, 1865–66 Ala. Laws 111; Act of Mar. 
8, 1867, No. 122, 1866–67 Ark. Acts 298; Act of Dec. 21, 1865, No. 16, 1865 La. 
Acts Extra Sess. 24; Act of Mar. 2, 1866, ch. 58, 1866 N.C. Spec. Sess. Laws 
122, amended by Act of Feb. 25, 1867, ch. 124, 1866–67 N.C. Sess. Laws 197; 
Act of Mar. 23, 1875, ch. 93, 1875 Tenn. Pub. Acts 168; Act of Nov. 1, 1866, ch. 
82, 1866 Tex. Gen. Laws 80; Act of Feb. 20, 1866, ch. 15, 1865–66 Va. Acts 83; 
see also Cohen, supra note 348, at 33. See generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ON-
LY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS AND 
THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (2001). 
 355. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 22, 1879, No. 175, 1878–1879 Ala. Acts 205; Act of 
June 1, 1903, ch. 5192, 1903 Fla. Laws 135; Act of Feb. 16, 1876, ch. 4, 1876 
Ga. Laws 17; Act of Mar. 11, 1912, ch. 94, 1912 Miss. Laws 73; Act of Dec. 24, 
1891, no. 697, 1891 N.C. Acts 1084; Act of Feb. 6, 1891, ch. 75, 1891 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 77; see also Cohen, supra note 348, at 31.  See generally BERNSTEIN, su-
pra note 354 (examining how post-Civil War labor regulations harmed Afri-
can-Americans). 
 356. Act of Feb. 28, 1877, No. 122, 1877 Ga. Laws 120; see also Cohen, su-
pra note 348, at 39. 
 357. Act of Nov. 25, 1865, ch. 4, 1865 Miss. Laws 82, 85; see also Cohen, 
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banking regulations stifled the development of credit markets, 
giving creditor-employers monopoly power over their debtor-
employees.358 Share croppers engaged in monocultural farm-
ing—generally cotton—were dependent on credit to purchase 
the equipment and foodstuffs that they could not produce 
themselves. Shielded from competition, many employers sold 
necessaries to workers on credit at inflated prices, creating a 
condition of chronic indebtedness that could then be the predi-
cate for prosecution in the event that the worker quit.359  
Southern states also enacted extremely broad vagrancy 
laws that in effect made unemployment a crime. For example, 
in “September 1901 a number of Mississippi towns rounded up 
‘idlers and vagrants’ and drove them ‘into the cotton fields 
where the farmers are crying for labor to pick the season’s 
crop.’”360 Likewise, one Tennessee judge announced that any 
African-American brought before him on vagrancy charges be 
set “free provided they would accept jobs offered by farmers 
who have set up a cry over scarcity of ‘hands.’”361 Hence, Afri-
can-American workers frequently faced the threat of criminal 
prosecution for vagrancy if they did not enter into contracts 
with employers, which then often involved an advance on wag-
es, creating debt bondage.362 Vagrancy arrests, of course, could 
also be used as the predicate offense for sale of labor under the 
criminal surety system.363 Finally, in at least some cases the 
system of peonage was accompanied by violence364 and sexual 
exploitation.365  
 
supra note 348, at 39. 
 358. See Roger L. Ransom & Richard Sutch, Debt Peonage in the Cotton 
South After the Civil War, 32 J. ECON. HIST. 641, 652–55 (1972). Legislation 
passed during the Civil War forbade nationally chartered banks from provid-
ing agricultural mortgage credit, which basically shut them out of the South-
ern market. Id. at 646. Congress, however, also passed a law heavily taxing 
the note issue of all nonnational banks. Id. Finally, deposit banking—i.e., the 
use of checks as a substitute for bank notes—failed to develop because “the 
sparseness of the population and the high rate of illiteracy in the rural South[ ] 
meant that the transaction costs associated with accepting and clearing checks 
discouraged the use of deposits.” Id. at 647. 
 359.  See id. at 642, 653–54. 
 360. Cohen, supra note 348, at 50. 
 361. Id. 
 362.  See id. at 50–53. 
 363.  See id. 
 364. See, e.g., Carper, supra note 348, at 95 (“Brown beat his laborers un-
mercifully. On several occasions his nephew, Mose Brown, whipped the labor-
ers so severely that they died.”). 
 365. See, e.g., id. (“According to Lizzie Rush, if a good looking woman came 
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Given the reality of coercion, financial exploitation, dura-
tion, and domination involved in Jim Crow labor relationships, 
it is not surprising that the Court upheld convictions under the 
Anti-Peonage Act as a legitimate exercise of congressional pow-
er under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment,366 struck 
down state laws creating a presumption of fraud when an in-
debted worker quit,367 and overturned criminal-surety sta-
tutes.368 In doing so, it struck at conditions well within the orig-
inal understanding of “involuntary servitude.” 
The Court, however, ultimately rested its holding on 
sweeping assertions that cannot be reconciled with either this 
original understanding of “involuntary servitude” or its own 
subsequent holdings. In Clyatt v. United States the Court heard 
a challenge to the criminalization of “holding of any person to 
service or labor under the system known as peonage.”369 Since 
the term “peonage” was not defined in the statute, the Court 
turned to New Mexican cases for its meaning. In doing so, how-
ever, the Court simply defined peonage as  a status or condition 
of compulsory service based on indebtedness.370 It failed to ac-
knowledge the reality of peonage, which involved not only legal 
or contractual obligations to work off a debt, but also the back-
ground laws and practices that forced African-American work-
ers into peonage agreements with employers,371 allowed mas-
ters to extend the servitude of peons over long periods of time 
in return for nominal compensation,372 and allowed masters to 
coerce service from peons with direct physical violence.373 The 
failure to acknowledge the social reality of peonage and focus 
solely on formally enacted laws is puzzling, given that the 
Court acknowledged that the Thirteenth Amendment reached 
 
to Brown’s camp and one of the laborers told the Captain that he ‘wanted’ her, 
Brown would order the husband of the woman to other quarters while the wife 
stayed with the stranger.”). 
 366. See, e.g., Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 218 (1905). 
 367. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244–45 (1911). 
 368. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149–50 (1914). 
 369. 197 U.S. at 208 (quoting Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546). 
 370. See id. at 215–16 (discussing the meaning of “peonage”). 
 371. See supra text accompanying notes 360–65 (discussing the role of va-
grancy laws in coercing agreement to harsh labor contracts by African-
American workers). 
 372. See supra text accompanying note 352 (discussing laws that lowered 
peon wages by preventing competition among employers and granting them 
monopoly power over the extension of credit). 
 373. See supra text accompanying notes 364–65 (discussing private vi-
olence against peons by masters). 
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beyond state action to ban the condition of “involuntary servi-
tude,” whatever its origins.374  
In its next peonage case, the Court again focused narrowly 
on the legal status of the peon rather than the reality of the 
peonage system itself. In Bailey v. Alabama, Alonzo Bailey 
challenged an Alabama statute that created a presumption of 
fraud whenever a laborer quit work while indebted to his em-
ployer.375 The practical effect of the law was to criminalize the 
breach of a labor contract where the employer had advanced 
wages. Bailey entered into a one-year contract to work for 
twelve dollars per month and received a fifteen dollar ad-
vance.376 He subsequently quit after one month and was fined 
thirty dollars plus court costs and sentenced to 136 days of 
hard labor in lieu of payment.377 The Court spent the bulk of its 
opinion deciding that the intent of the complicated Alabama 
fraud statute was to coerce compliance with labor contracts.378 
Having disposed of that issue, the Court went on to hold that 
“involuntary servitude” existed whenever there was “compul-
sory service.” Writing for the Court, Justice Hughes stated: 
The act of Congress [i.e. the Anti-Peonage Act], nullifying all state 
laws by which it should be attempted to enforce the “service or labor 
of any person as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or 
otherwise,” necessarily embraces all legislation which seeks to compel 
the service or labor by making it a crime to refuse or fail to perform 
it.379 
 
 374. See Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 216 (“This amendment denounces a status or 
condition, irrespective of the manner or authority by which it is created.”). 
 375. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 227–28 (1911) (describing the 
Alabama statute and the cases construing it). Bailey had already made one 
unsuccessful trip to the Supreme Court by 1911. He originally sought to chal-
lenge the Alabama statute by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus in state 
court prior to being tried on the underlying offense. This procedure was al-
lowed under state law, and Bailey litigated his challenge up to the state su-
preme court and appealed from thence to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court, 
however, ruled that while such a preconviction collateral attack may be al-
lowed under state law, the Court could not consider the question until Bailey’s 
case had been fully tried on the merits in the court below. See Bailey v. Ala-
bama, 211 U.S. 452 (1908). 
 376. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 229–30. 
 377. Id. at 230–31. 
 378. See id. at 238 (“We cannot escape the conclusion that, although the 
statute in terms is to punish fraud, still its natural and inevitable effect is to 
expose to conviction for crime those who simply fail or refuse to perform con-
tracts for personal service in liquidation of a debt, and judging its purpose by 
its effect that it seeks in this way to provide the means of compulsion through 
which performance of such service may be secured.”). 
 379. Id. at 243. 
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The Court, however, did not recognize that the Alabama 
statute was embedded in a context of repressive labor regula-
tions and violent employment practices. The combination of the 
statute with this context created the conditions under which 
Bailey was forced to work. 
In United States v. Reynolds, several men charged under 
the Anti-Peonage Act for obtaining labor under state criminal 
surety laws challenged their indictments.380 The Court upheld 
the indictments, but rather than focusing on the fact that the 
contract between the surety and the prisoner was essentially 
coerced—if the prisoner did not agree he would be sent to pris-
on—the Court chose to rely on Bailey’s claim that any contract 
performed under the threat of state sanction constituted “invo-
luntary servitude.”381 Indeed, in order to avoid the blessing con-
ferred by the Thirteenth Amendment on “involuntary servi-
tude” in punishment for a crime, the Court laid special 
emphasis on the fact that “[t]he surety and convict have made a 
new contract for service, in regard to the terms of which the 
state has not been consulted,” as though the negotiation be-
tween the prisoner and the surety partook of standard bargain-
ing between an employer and a potential employee.382 
In 1944, the Court revisited the issue of peonage in Pollock 
v. Williams.383 After reaffirming its previous holdings in two 
brief opinions in earlier cases,384 the Court issued a much long-
er opinion in Pollock striking down a Florida anti-fraud statute 
similar to the one held unconstitutional in Bailey.385 The Court 
repeated the sweeping language of the earlier cases,386 but it 
 
 380. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 138–40 (1914). 
 381. See id. at 146 (“Compulsion of such service by the constant fear of im-
prisonment under the criminal laws renders the work compulsory, as much so 
as authority to arrest and hold his person would be if the law authorized that 
to be done.” (referencing Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244)). 
 382. Id. at 149–50. 
 383. 322 U.S. 4 (1944). 
 384. See id. at 10–11 (referencing United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 
529–30 (1944) (reversing a lower court holding that one could not be convicted 
under the Anti-Peonage Act for merely arresting someone with the intent of 
returning them to peonage), and Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942) 
(striking down a Georgia law virtually identical to the Alabama law struck 
down in Bailey)). 
 385. In Pollock the defendant pled guilty to fraud and the state argued that 
accordingly he could not challenge the portion of the law that created a vir-
tually irrebuttable presumption of fraud for workers who quit without repay-
ment of advances. Id. at 6–7. The Court ultimately decided that this distinc-
tion could not save the Florida law. Id. at 24–25. 
 386. See id. at 18 (“[The Anti-Peonage Act] means that no state can make 
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also offered a more nuanced picture of peonage, suggesting that 
it resulted from more than simply the laws directly at issue: “In 
each there was the same story, a necessitous and illiterate la-
borer, an agreement to work for a small wage, a trifling ad-
vance, a breach of contract to work.”387 It also linked the Thir-
teenth Amendment to concern about suppression of competition 
within the labor market although it failed to explicitly ac-
knowledge the way in which peonage was maintained by bank-
ing and labor regulations that exacerbated this problem: 
The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by 
the Antipeonage Act was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a 
system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United 
States . . . . When the master can compel and the laborer cannot es-
cape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and no 
incentive above to relive a harsh overlordship or unwholesome condi-
tions of work. Resulting depression of working conditions and living 
standards affects not only the laborer under the system, but every 
other with whom his labor comes in competition.388 
Read most expansively, the Peonage Cases render any 
sanction for breach of a labor contract beyond compensatory 
damages unconstitutional.389 The problem with such a reading, 
as the Court acknowledged even at the time, is that it has 
upheld compulsory labor other than as punishment for a crime 
in other cases.390 Hence, during the same period that it handed 
down the Peonage Cases, the Court upheld laws compelling 
seamen to work ships according to their contracts,391 laws re-
 
the quitting of work any component of a crime, or make criminal sanctions 
available for holding unwilling persons to labor.”). 
 387. Id. at 22. 
 388. Id. at 17–18. 
 389. See, e.g., Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215–16 (1905) (“A clear 
distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or 
rendering of services in payment of a debt. In the latter case the debtor, 
though contracting to pay his indebtedness by labor or service, and subject like 
any other contractor to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can 
elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels performance or a con-
tinuance of the service.”). 
 390. See, e.g., Pollock, 322 U.S. at 17–18 (“Forced labor in some special cir-
cumstances may be consistent with the general basic system of free labor. For 
example, . . . there are duties such as work on highways which society may 
compel.”); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 243 (1911) (“We need not stop to 
consider any possible limits or exceptional cases, such as the service of a sai-
lor, or the obligations of a child to its parents, or of an apprentice to his mas-
ter, or the power of the legislature to make unlawful and punish criminally an 
abandonment by an employé of his post of labor in any extreme cases.” (citing 
Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 216 (citations omitted))). 
 391. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–88 (1897) (upholding a 
federal statute compelling seamen to perform their contracts on pain of impri-
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quiring labor on public highways,392 and laws drafting men for 
military service,393 all of which involved non-compensatory 
sanctions for failure to work. Such cases, of course, might be 
explained as arising in situations where the government has 
traditionally exercised a right to compel service. There is, how-
ever, a deeper problem with the notion that any labor under a 
contract done because of the threat of a sanction constitutes 
“involuntary servitude.” As Justice Holmes pointed out in his 
dissent in Bailey: 
The Thirteenth Amendment does not outlaw contracts for labor. That 
would be at least as great a misfortune for the laborer as for the man 
that employed him. For it certainly would affect the terms of the bar-
gain unfavorably for the laboring man if it were understood that the 
employer could do nothing in case the laborer saw fit to break his 
word. But any legal liability for breach of a contract is a disagreeable 
consequence which tends to make the contractor do as he said he 
would. Liability to an action for damages has that tendency as well as 
a fine.394 
At least part of the purpose of entering into a legally bind-
ing contract is to make the performance of a promise more like-
ly by attaching legal sanctions to its breach. Allowing sanctions 
in the form of compensatory damages but not other sanctions 
(such as civil or criminal contempt for refusal to obey a court 
order) is arbitrary. What is needed is some principle that ex-
plains why sanctions are unconstitutional in one context but 
not the other. The solution suggested by the original under-
standing of “involuntary servitude” is to examine the actual 
condition of the promisor, rather than the particular remedy 
used to enforce the contract. Read according to the terms of 
their most broadly phrased dicta, however, the Peonage Cases 
fail to provide such a principle. Any performance under a con-
tract done out of fear of a legal sanction would become “invo-
luntary servitude.” Not surprisingly, in subsequent cases nei-
ther the U.S. Supreme Court nor lower courts have followed the 
sweeping language contained in the Peonage Cases. Rather, 
they have upheld various forms of compulsory work in the face 
of Thirteenth Amendment challenges when the severity of ei-
ther the sanction or labor involved failed to rise to the level of 
some inchoate standard of “involuntary servitude.” 
 
sonment). 
 392. See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (upholding a Florida sta-
tute requiring able-bodied citizens to work on state roads). 
 393. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (upholding 
the constitutionality of the draft). 
 394. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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C. MODERN CASES 
The Court emphasized the complete domination required 
to find “involuntary servitude” in its most recent case to consid-
er the Thirteenth Amendment, United States v. Kozminski.395 
The case involved a circuit split over the meaning of federal 
statutes criminalizing the imposition of “involuntary servi-
tude.”396 The Kozminskis had “employed” two mentally re-
tarded men for nearly twenty years, providing them with little 
or no compensation beyond inadequate housing, food, clothing, 
and medical care, and subjected them to physical and verbal 
abuse.397 They were tried for violating federal law and objected 
to the jury instructions stating that involuntary servitude “may 
also include situations involving either physical and other coer-
cion, or a combination thereof, used to detain persons in em-
ployment.” The Sixth Circuit agreed, holding that the district 
court improperly allowed the jury to consider psychological 
coercion.398  
On appeal, the Court upheld the circuit court. In con-
struing the statutes, Justice O’Connor looked to the Peonage 
Cases, noting that, in those cases, “involuntary servitude” had 
been predicated on the fact that “the victim had no available 
choice but to work or be subject to legal sanction.”399 In the next 
paragraph, however, the Court acknowledged, “Our precedents 
reveal that not all situations in which labor is compelled by 
 
 395. 487 U.S. 931 (1988). The Court’s resolution of the specific issue in this 
case—the necessity of a showing of physical or legal coercion to demonstrate 
the absence of voluntary consent—has been subject to some criticism by com-
mentators. See Kathleen Kim, Psychological Coercion in the Context of Mod-
ern-Day Involuntary Labor: Revisiting United States v. Kozminski and Under-
standing Human Trafficking, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 941, 944 (2007) (describing 
the necessity of recognizing psychological coercion as sufficient to meet the le-
gal standard for involuntary labor); Aric K. Short, Slaves for Rent: Sexual Ha-
rassment in Housing as Involuntary Servitude, 86 NEB. L. REV. 838, 872–78 
(2008) (stating that there is little reason to distinguish physical and legal 
coercion from psychological, economic, or social coercion). 
 396. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2006) (criminalizing conspiracy to interfere with 
constitutionally protected rights); id. § 1584 (criminalizing the knowing and 
willful holding of another in “involuntary servitude”). Compare United States 
v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1192–93 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that 
“involuntary servitude” did not include psychological coercion), judgment aff ’d 
and remanded, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), with United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 
1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that “involuntary servitude” can include 
psychological coercion). 
 397. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934–36. 
 398. Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 1193. 
 399. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 943. 
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physical coercion or force of law violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment.”400 Faced with these conflicting precedents, the 
Court found that at minimum prosecutors must prove “the use 
or threatened use of physical or legal coercion.”401  
Lower courts faced with claims of “involuntary servitude” 
have adopted a similarly narrow reading of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, particularly in the context of challenges to equit-
able relief. For example, state courts have uniformly rejected 
the claim that orders to pay alimony constitute involuntary 
servitude.402 Additionally, in Warwick v. Warwick,403 the trial 
court’s order to appellant to get a job in order to pay a debt on 
pain of contempt did not impose involuntary servitude, accord-
ing to the Minnesota appellate court.404 
In Moss v. Superior Court,405 the California Supreme Court 
provided the most extensive analysis to date of the constitutio-
nality of court orders requiring a party to affirmatively work. 
Early California cases held that while contempt could be used 
to force a husband to pay alimony if he had the money to do so, 
it could not be used to sanction his inability to do so, including 
a refusal to obtain available employment.406 In Moss, the Cali-
 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. at 944. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan argued that “invo-
luntary servitude” existed whenever a person was reduced to a slave-like con-
dition, regardless of the means used to do so. See id. at 955–65 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). Interestingly, Justice Brennan cites a 1910 Webster’s Dictionary 
that included in the definition of “servitude”: “In French and English Colonies 
of the 17th and 18th centuries, the conditions of transported or colonial labor-
ers who, under contract or by custom rendered service with temporary and li-
mited loss of political and personal liberty.” Id. at 961 (quoting Webster’s New 
International Dictionary of the English Language). The blanket inclusion of 
indenture agreements within the scope of “involuntary servitude,” however, 
cannot be squared with its pre-Civil War usage, which was often assumed to 
be consistent with indenture agreements. See generally supra text accompany-
ing notes 102, 105–16, 126–42. 
 402. See Hicks v. Hicks, 387 So. 2d 207, 208 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Freeman 
v. Freeman, 397 A.2d 554, 557 n.2 (D.C. 1979); In re Marriage of Smith, 396 
N.E.2d 859, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Clark v. Clark, 278 S.W. 65, 68 (Tenn. 
1925). 
 403. 438 N.W.2d 673 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 404. Id. at 679 (citing Freeman v. Freeman, 397 A.2d 554, 557 n.2 (D.C. 
App. 1979)). 
 405. 950 P.2d 59 (Cal. 1998). 
 406. See Ex parte Todd, 50 P. 1071, 1071 (Cal. 1897) (holding that contempt 
where a husband “had wholly failed and neglected to make any effort to obtain 
employment . . . was clearly in excess of the power of the court . . . .”); In re 
Brown, 288 P.2d 27, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (holding that a husband’s 
choice to remain unemployed to avoid paying alimony to his ex-wife was “in-
sufficient to warrant citation for contempt”). 
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fornia Supreme Court overturned this line of cases, holding 
that a child-support obligor could be punished with criminal 
contempt for failure to work, the Thirteenth Amendment not-
withstanding.407 
The California Supreme Court began its analysis by look-
ing to the origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, noting that 
the prohibition on “involuntary servitude” was drawn from the 
Northwest Ordinance, which “expressly permitted contracts for 
apprenticeship and indenture if voluntarily entered into for 
valuable consideration.”408 “Involuntary servitude,” the court 
noted, “is found only when a person is held to labor under con-
ditions akin to peonage or slavery.”409 In contrast, the court in-
sisted that despite the court order to work, the “parent is free 
to elect the type of employment and the employer. . . .”410 Fur-
thermore, such employment does not become “involuntary ser-
vitude” merely “because a person would prefer not to work but 
must do so in order to comply with a legal duty to support the 
person’s children.”411 Rather, the court’s analysis relied on the 
fact that when “compulsory labor akin to African slavery”412 is 
not involved, the “Thirteenth Amendment does not bar labor 
that an individual may, at least in some sense, choose not to 
perform, even where the consequences of that choice are ‘excee-
dingly bad.’”413 
 
 407. See Moss, 950 P.2d at 64 (“[I]nsofar as Todd may apply to child sup-
port obligations, it should be disapproved. . . . We are satisfied that there is no 
constitutional impediment to use the contempt power to punish a parent who, 
otherwise lacking monetary ability to pay child support, willfully fails and re-
fuses to seek and accept available employment commensurate with the par-
ent’s skills and abilities.”). 
 408. See id. at 66 n.5. 
 409. Id. at 68. 
 410. Id. at 67. 
 411. Id. at 71–72. The court’s reasoning here recognizes the absence of a 
sharp divide between labor to which one freely consents and labor done to 
avoid some legally created sanction. In doing so, the court implicitly adopts the 
line of analysis offered by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Bailey v. Alabama. 
See 219 U.S. 219, 246 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 412. Moss, 950 P.2d at 68 (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 
(1916)). 
 413. Id. at 72 (quoting Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 459 
(2d Cir. 1996)). The Moss court offered an alternative line analysis to its ar-
gument that court-ordered employment did not constitute “involuntary servi-
tude.” See id. at 67–68. Noting that the duty to support one’s children “rests on 
fundamental natural laws and has always been recognized by the courts in the 
absence of any statute declaring it,” id. at 67 (citation omitted), the court said: 
Even if the necessity of accepting employment in order to meet this 
obligation were somehow analogous to those forms of compelled labor 
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VI.  “INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE” AND SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE   
When read against the background of its original meaning 
and subsequent construction by the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Thirteenth Amendment cannot support a per se rule against 
equitable enforcement of personal service contracts. The consti-
tutions and courts of the states carved from the Northwest Ter-
ritory provide a coherent account of the meaning of the 1787 
ordinance’s ban on “involuntary servitude.”414 “Involuntary ser-
vitude” did not encompass any attempt to sanction the breach 
of a labor contract. Rather, it was an amalgamation of four con-
cerns. The first was with contracts where the initial agreement 
was a sham because the background laws and social practices 
put the promisor completely under the power of the promi-
see.415 The second was the inadequate compensation of workers 
for their services.416 The absence of meaningful pay—
“unrequited toil”—was a sine qua non of slavery, and to avoid 
the possibility of “involuntary servitude” a contract required 
“bona fide consideration.”417 Third, “involuntary servitude” 
could result when contracts of service extended over very long 
periods of time.418 Hence, Ohio had a per se ban on contracts 
binding “negroes” to service for over a year, and the Indiana 
Supreme Court denounced as “involuntary servitude” a con-
tract stretching over twenty years.419 Finally, “involuntary ser-
vitude” involved the right of masters to physically punish and 
detain their servants, thereby completely dominating them.420 
While these four factors never constituted a formalized 
doctrinal test prior to the Civil War, Congress clearly adopted 
the Northwest Ordinance’s language in drafting the Thirteenth 
Amendment.421 It is this language that became part of the Con-
 
[i.e., peonage and slavery], we have no doubt that this form of labor 
would be recognized as an exception to the ban on involuntary servi-
tude found in the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Id. at 68. 
 414. See supra text accompanying notes 92–118. 
 415. See supra text accompanying notes 92, 94–101. 
 416. See supra text accompanying notes 93, 99–103. 
 417. See supra text accompanying notes 92–103. 
 418. See supra text accompanying notes 102–03. 
 419. See supra text accompanying notes 102–11. 
 420. See supra text accompanying notes 112–21. 
 421. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude . . . shall exist within the United States . . . .”), with Northwest Or-
dinance, supra note 84 (“There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude in the said territory . . . .”).  
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stitution, and whatever the aspirations of some of the Amend-
ment’s supporters, they were operating within established lin-
guistic conventions. Indeed, congressional supporters repeated-
ly noted that “involuntary servitude” served to expand the 
reach of the Amendment’s prohibition beyond chattel slavery to 
include relationships that involved the same degradation as 
slavery.422 Furthermore, in the debates over implementing leg-
islation, congressmen frequently cited instances of these four 
concerns as evidence of “involuntary servitude” within their 
power to suppress.423 
It is unclear whether each of these factors is individually 
necessary or sufficient for “involuntary servitude,” but nothing 
in this original meaning forbids a court from ordering specific 
performance of a contract that does not involve any of these 
four elements. Hence, for example, ordering specific perfor-
mance of a contract by a sophisticated music performer who vo-
luntarily agreed to perform a single concert for a substantial 
fee after an arms length negotiation cannot reasonably be con-
strued as “involuntary servitude.” The original obligation is 
freely entered into. The work is well compensated. The tempor-
al extent of the contract is limited. The owner of the venue 
lacks the power to personally detain, beat, or otherwise abuse 
the performer. On the other hand, the original meaning of “in-
voluntary servitude” could prohibit the specific performance of 
certain kinds of contracts. Suppose, for example, that an illegal 
immigrant promised to work for a violent sweatshop owner for 
ten years in return for subsistence wages and under the threat 
of being turned into the immigration authorities. The specific 
enforcement of such a contract would tread on all four elements 
of “involuntary servitude.” 
The judicial construction of the Thirteenth Amendment is 
not doctrinally organized around these four elements. Indeed, 
the Court lacks any clear doctrinal framework for evaluating 
claims of involuntary servitude. In Robertson, the Court sug-
gested that the penal enforcement of any contract voluntarily 
entered into cannot be involuntary servitude.424 In contrast, the 
Peonage Cases suggest that even a fully voluntary contract be-
comes “involuntary servitude” if its performance results from 
any threat of legal sanctions.425 Neither of these approaches, 
 
 422. See supra text accompanying notes 215–21. 
 423. See supra Part IV.B. 
 424. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 280–81 (1897). 
 425. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944) (“[N]o state can 
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however, can be reconciled with subsequent holdings, which 
have tended to uphold sanction-backed obligations to perform 
certain kinds of labor, so long as the conditions of the obligation 
itself are not extreme.426 Indeed, in the face of the doctrinal in-
coherence of judicial construction of “involuntary servitude,” 
the multi-factor approach of the original meaning resolves the 
outcomes of the cases and better orients analysis of Thirteenth 
Amendment claims than anything yet offered by the Court. 
Even taken at face value, the most sweeping dicta in the 
Peonage Cases and the judicial opinions following their lead 
suggest only that breach of a labor contract cannot be made a 
crime.427 There is no reason, however, that such a rule would 
preclude civil contempt for breach of contract, particularly in 
light of the fact that the Peonage Cases explicitly endorse the 
civil sanction of money damages for breach of contract, which, 
as Justice Holmes pointed out, can have precisely the same ef-
fect as a fine.428 Indeed, it is not clear that even criminal con-
tempt would necessarily come within a prohibition making 
breach of contract a crime. In Smolczyk v. Gaston,429 the Ne-
braska Supreme Court held that punishing contempt with im-
prisonment at hard labor would constitute involuntary servi-
tude under a Nebraska state constitutional provision virtually 
identical to the Thirteenth Amendment, precisely because con-
tempt sanctions did not constitute punishment for a crime, and 
therefore did not come under the criminal sentence exception to 
the Amendment’s ban.430 This holding, however, suggests that 
punishment for criminal contempt is not the same thing as pu-
nishment for a crime. Hence, one could argue that an order of 
specific performance backed by criminal contempt would not be 
tantamount to criminalizing breach of contract. 
The application of these arguments is best illustrated with 
an example. This Article began with two hypothetical scena-
rios, the second of which was based on the case of Vanderbilt 
University v. DiNardo.431 Gerry DiNardo, a successful college 
football coach, entered into a contract with Vanderbilt Univer-
 
make the quitting of work any component of a crime . . . .”). 
 426. See, e.g., Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 64 (Cal. 1998); Warwick 
v. Warwick, 438 N.W.2d 673, 679 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 427.  See supra note 344 and accompanying text. 
 428.  See supra text accompanying note 394. 
 429.  24 N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 1946). 
 430.  Id. at 865. 
 431. 174 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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sity to coach its team for five years.432 The contract was subse-
quently extended for an additional two years.433 Under the 
terms of the contract, DiNardo’s base salary was $100,000 per 
year with various bonuses based on the performance of the 
team.434 After coaching at Vanderbilt for four years, DiNardo 
accepted a much more lucrative offer from Louisiana State 
University.435 Vanderbilt sued for breach of contract, and, una-
ble to ask for specific performance, sought payment under a li-
quidated damages clause.436 After Vanderbilt’s victory in the 
district court was partially overturned on appeal, DiNardo and 
the University settled for an undisclosed amount.437 
Imagine that rather than seeking liquidated damages, 
Vanderbilt had sought specific performance of the contract. The 
term “specific performance” can sometimes mean simply the 
doing of what is promised in a contract,438 but generally it re-
fers to a court order requiring a breaching party to perform his 
obligations on pain of contempt.439 Contempt can be punished 
by either fines or imprisonment, neither of which eliminates 
the offense.440 Rather, the contempt can only be discharged by 
 
 432. Id. at 753. 
 433. See id. at 754. This fact was disputed, and ultimately remanded to the 
district court for further fact finding. Id. at 760. 
 434. See Employment Contract between Vanderbilt University & Gary Di-
Nardo § 4(a) (Dec. 3, 1990) (on file with author) (setting forth a “Base Salary” 
of $100,000 and offering an “incentive bonus” of 1/12th the “Base Salary” “if 
the football team is selected and plays in a post-season bowl game sanctioned 
by the NCAA”). See also id. § 4(c) (“As additional compensation, the University 
agrees to provide Mr. DiNardo on a loan basis two (2) automobiles selected by 
the University for his use for so long as he is Head Football Coach.”). 
 435. DiNardo’s salary from LSU was $585,000. See Michael Smith, SEC 
Coaches’ Salaries Reflect Competitive Times, Schools Paying More, Adding 
Perks to Keep Up, THE STATE (S.C.), June 18, 1999, at C1. 
 436.  Vanderbilt University v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 752 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 437. See DiNardo Settles Suit with Vanderbilt, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., May 
11, 2000, at 7. 
 438. See, e.g., In re Mary Clark, 1 Blackf. 122, 124 (Ind. 1821) (speaking of 
“a specific performance of a covenant” that the law might or might not choose 
to enforce). 
 439.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “specific 
performance” as “[a] court-ordered remedy that requires precise fulfillment of 
a legal or contractual obligation when monetary damages are inappropriate or 
inadequate, as when the sale of real estate or a rare article is involved”). 
 440. See Cheap-O’s Truck Stop, Inc. v. Cloyd, 567 S.E.2d 514, 519 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 2002) (“The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. Its ex-
istence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to 
the enforcement of the judgments, orders and writs of the courts, and conse-
quently to the due administration of justice.” (quoting Curlee v. Howle, 287 
S.E.2d 915, 917 (S.C. 1982) (internal quotation omitted))); Carty v. Schneider, 
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complying with the court’s order.441 Hence, in theory a court re-
quiring specific performance could imprison a breaching party 
indefinitely until he complied with the judicial order to do what 
he promised under the contract.442 Such incarceration for con-
tempt is not unlimited, however. Once performance under the 
court order becomes impossible, a contemnor must be released. 
In actual practice, imprisoning parties for contempt is rare, and 
courts generally enforce their orders with the civil sanction of a 
fine. Hence, in seeking specific performance of the DiNardo 
contract, Vanderbilt would be seeking to have the state inter-
vene in its dispute not to punish DiNardo for breach but rather 
to exert pressure on him to perform, so long as such perfor-
mance was possible. 
The first question presented would be whether an order of 
specific performance by DiNardo would constitute “involuntary 
servitude” under the Thirteenth Amendment. The answer here 
would clearly be no. There was absolutely no evidence that Di-
Nardo’s consent to the contract lacked the “perfect freedom” re-
quired under the state constitutions of the Old Northwest. Di-
Nardo had the assistance of his brother, who was an attorney, 
and if anything, he operated in a market in which successful 
coaches rather than universities have the bargaining power.443 
The contract did potentially extend over seven years, and the 
order of specific performance would have extended for from one 
to three years. At some point, the term of a contract becomes 
 
986 F. Supp. 933, 939 n.13 (V.I. 1997). The court in Carty described civil con-
tempt sanctions as conditional sentences that “permit the contemnor to relieve 
himself from all sanctions through compliance. Thus, the penalty is usually 
either (1) a jail sentence of indefinite duration, which the contemnor may 
avoid by agreeing to comply with the underlying order, or (2) a fine triggered 
by future violations of the underlying order.” Id.  
 441. See, e.g., Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585, 592 (5th Cir. 1965) (“[S]ince 
sanctions imposed in civil contempt proceedings must always give to the al-
leged contemnor the opportunity to bring himself into compliance, the sanction 
cannot be one that does not come to an end when he repents his past conduct 
and purges himself.”). 
 442. State v. Cottrill, 511 S.E.2d 488, 497 (W.Va. 1998) (“The appropriate 
sanction in a civil contempt case is an order that incarcerates a contemner for 
an indefinite term and that also specifies a reasonable manner in which the 
contempt may be purged thereby securing the immediate release of the con-
temner . . . .”). 
 443. See Vanderbilt University v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 754 (6th Cir. 
1998) (noting that DiNardo consulted with his brother Larry, the lawyer); Pam 
Louwagie, Contract Provisions Favor College Coaches, STAR TRIB. (Minneapo-
lis), Apr. 4, 2002, at 1A (“Colleges and universities feel they have little bar-
gaining power, and allow agents to write protections into contracts for the 
coaches . . . but few protections for the schools . . . .”). 
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“too long,” under the Thirteenth Amendment, but the Ohio con-
stitution’s gloss on “involuntary servitude” suggests that at a 
minimum a single year of government-enforced service under a 
contract is unobjectionable.444 There is no plausible question 
here about whether or not DiNardo’s contract was supported by 
“bona fide consideration.”445 Over $100,000 per year simply 
cannot be characterized as “unrequited toil.”446 Finally, Van-
derbilt University did not seek to exert direct physical control 
or dominion over DiNardo. 
These four elements—involuntariness ab initio, extended 
time, the absence of real compensation, and personal dominion 
over the servant by the master—constituted “involuntary servi-
tude” at the time that the Thirteenth Amendment was passed, 
and the Supreme Court has yet to find “involuntary servitude” 
in any case except those in which at least some of the ele-
ments—and arguably all of them—are present. Accordingly, it 
cannot be maintained that a case in which they are wholly ab-
sent constitutes “involuntary servitude.” In short, requiring 
DiNardo to perform under his contract to Vanderbilt would not 
have constituted slavery or anything like it for constitutional 
purposes. 
One might argue that the Thirteenth Amendment demon-
strates that it simply preempts certain kinds of contracts, ren-
dering them void and unenforceable even by an award of dam-
ages. On this view, the Thirteenth Amendment might nullify 
DiNardo’s contract regardless of the remedy that Vanderbilt 
sought. The problem with this preemption argument is that it 
misconceives how the Thirteenth Amendment operates. Al-
though it mentions slavery, which was a legal relationship un-
der antebellum law, the Amendment is not ultimately directed 
at any particular legal category per se.447 This is why, for ex-
 
 444. See OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2. 
 445. See id. 
 446.  See id. 
 447. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988) (“The prima-
ry purpose of the Amendment was to abolish the institution of African slavery 
. . . , but the Amendment was not limited to that purpose; the phrase ‘involun-
tary servitude’ was intended to extend ‘to cover those forms of compulsory la-
bor akin to African slavery . . . .’” (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 
(1916))); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“[S]lavery cannot exist 
without law[] any more than property in lands and goods can exist without 
law: . . . therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment may be regarded as nullifying 
all State laws which establish or uphold slavery. But it has a reflex character 
also, establishing and decreeing universal civil and political freedom . . . .”). 
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ample, the Amendment has no state action requirement.448 Ra-
ther, it forbids the actual existence of a particular set of condi-
tions within the United States.449 The Amendment is violated 
not when someone promises to enter into a condition of “invo-
luntary servitude,” but rather when the individual actually en-
ters into that condition, with or without the complicity of the 
state. Hence, I propose that specific performance of a personal 
service contract would only violate the Thirteenth Amendment 
in those relatively rare cases where specific performance of the 
contract would actually result in “involuntary servitude.” 
Likewise, allowing the award of damages for breach of a con-
tract could only violate the Amendment when the debt created 
by such an award would itself cause “involuntary servitude” to 
result. Given current law, even a very large debt would not 
cause “involuntary servitude.” Laws such as the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act and state homestead exemptions limit the 
power of judgment creditors over their debtors.450 Likewise, 
with the exception of certain special kinds of debts such as fed-
erally subsidized student loans,451 debt created by contract can 
be discharged in bankruptcy.452 To be sure, when remedies for 
debt allow the kind of domination seen in the Peonage Cases, 
an award of damages might lead to a condition of “involuntary 
servitude.”453 Likewise, public policy exceptions and the doc-
 
 448. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942 (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment extends 
beyond state action . . . .”); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 
(1968) (“As its text reveals, the Thirteenth Amendment ‘is not a mere prohibi-
tion of state laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declara-
tion that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the 
United States.’” (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20)); see also 1 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-15, at 924 (3d ed. 
2000) (observing that the Thirteenth Amendment “is not subject to a state ac-
tion requirement”).  
 449. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942 (stating that the Amendment is “self-
executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable 
to any existing state of circumstances” (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. at 20) (internal quotations omitted)); cf. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
at 20 (“By its own unaided force and effect, [the Thirteenth Amendment] ab-
olished slavery, and established universal freedom.”). 
 450. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f ) (2006); 
LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT 13–19 (5th ed. 
2006) (discussing state homestead exemptions). 
 451. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006) (exempting federally subsidized stu-
dent loans from discharge in bankruptcy except in cases of “undue hardship on 
the debtor and the debtor’s dependents”). 
 452. See id. § 524(a) (describing the effects of a discharge of indebtedness in 
bankruptcy). 
 453. Cf. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215–17 (1905) (holding that 
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trine of unconscionability might void contracts whose specific 
enforcement could lead to “involuntary servitude.”454 However, 
so long as the breach of contract gives rise only to a claim for 
damages, it is unlikely that the mere enforcement of a contract 
by damages would violate the Thirteenth Amendment given the 
current law associated with debt.455 
In short, DiNardo could be compelled to perform his con-
tract without running afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Whether it would be wise to do so as a matter of common-law 
development is beyond the scope of this article. The Thirteenth 
Amendment is not a conversation stopper in this case. 
  CONCLUSION   
For more than a century, the assumption that ordering 
specific performance of a personal service contract would con-
stitute “involuntary servitude” under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment has hung over the law of contract remedies. This claim 
has had the effect of ossifying development of the law, preclud-
ing courts from critically examining the merits of specific per-
formance in the employment context. A recovery of the original 
meaning of “involuntary servitude,” coupled with a reading of 
the cases construing the Thirteenth Amendment, however, re-
veals that the argument against specific performance cannot be 
sustained in any but the most extreme situations. To be sure, 
when a contract is entered into while under the domination of 
another, extends for a long period of time, lacks adequate com-
pensation, and involves the on-going domination of the master 
over the servant, the specific performance of such a contract 
would violate the Constitution’s ban on “involuntary servitude.” 
 
debt bondage was a form of “involuntary servitude” under the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
 454. Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948) (“[A] 
party who has offered and succeeded in getting an agreement as tough as this 
one is, should not come to a chancellor and ask court help in the enforcement 
of its terms. That equity does not enforce unconscionable bargains is too well 
established to require elaborate citation.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 178(1) (1981) (“A promise or other term of an agreement is unenfor-
ceable on grounds of public policy if . . . the interest in its enforcement is clear-
ly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement 
of such terms.”). 
 455. But cf. Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165, 167–68 (1990) (ar-
guing that forcing debtors to work in repayment of debts under a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy in order to obtain a discharge of indebtedness may create a Thir-
teenth Amendment problem of unconstitutional conditions). 
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Affirmative contracts to perform services—as opposed to at-will 
employment relationships—are relatively rare, and they gener-
ally involve elites such as entertainers, professional athletes, 
coaches, and professors. Even when such contracts involve 
more ordinary workers, the agreements are still generally vo-
luntary, limited, compensated, and free from direct physical 
coercion. In short, they fall outside the Constitution’s domain. 
The question of whether they ought to be enforced is left open 
by this examination, but the analysis does show that common 
law development in this area ought to proceed without conver-
sation-stopping constitutional claims. 
 
